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I. INTRODUCTION
After more than ten years of legislative, judicial and bureaucratic
tinkering, the public information system created by the Freedom of In-
PUBLIC INFORMWTION SYSTEM
formation Act (FOIA) is still far from satisfactory.2 The present pub-
lic information system has not been successful because its drafters
lacked imagination and failed to do the basic work necessary to create
a sound foundation for such a comprehensive program. They failed to
analyze the realistic goals of a public information system; they ignored
the ultimate goals of improved government performance; they misrep-
resented the system's costs, both in monetary expense to taxpayers and
in diminished government performance. They considered neither al-
ternative techniques nor the problem of designing the public informa-
tion system as an integral part of the total governmental structure.
Actual open government for the benefit of the general populace will be
possible only if the basic weaknesses of the present system are explored
in depth. This Article is an appeal to Congress to undertake the careful
analysis necessary to construct a workable, useful public information
system.
It is misleading to assume that the release of information in
government files is per se beneficial; ultimately, a public information
system is beneficial only if it improves government. If the system de-
tracts from the performance of government, then the system fails even
if it offers access to great quantities of information in government files.
In short, the amount of information released by the functioning of the
system is not the true measure of the system's value; the true measure is
whether the government benefits its citizenry more as a result of the
system than would be the case without it.
This Article attempts to explain why, after over ten years of
thoughtful judicial opinions, creative scholarly comments and volumi-
nous congressional proceedings, the public information system has not
been a success. The total blame for this breakdown has been placed on
the bureaucracy, 3 detracting from any incentive to investigate the real
causes of the breakdown. The contention of this Article is that the
weaknesses of the Act are the result of the absence of any analysis of
realistic goals for a government information access program and the
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amendedby Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974). Legisla-
tive history of both the original act and the amendments can be found in two "sourcebooks,"
Sourcebook I and Sourcebook I.
2. In Oct. 1977, Congressman Preyer remarked: "Disclosure of public information remains
an unsolved mystery to Congress." 123 CONG. REc. H10581-2 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977).
3. See, e.g., Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 710 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1976); 2 Freedom of Information, Executive
Privilege, Secrecy in Government Hearings on S. 1142 Before the Subconm. on Adm. Practice and
Procedure and Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 55
(1973) (statement of Peter Schuck, Consumers Union); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play" Hide
and Seek under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEx. L. REv. 1261 (1970); Nader, Freedom
from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 1 (1970).
Vol. 1979:11
DUKE LAW JOURN4L
alternative mechanisms available to accomplish such goals. The Arti-
cle attempts to delineate the major goals of a public information system
and then probe the weaknesses of the Act in terms of these goals.4 Al-
though recommendations are offered, the authors will be satisfied if the
Article serves to encourage new thinking about access to government
information based on clearly articulated and realistic goals and on the
assumption that a public information system must represent a workable
and affordable part of the total government system.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST FAILURE: THE FAILURE TO INTEGRATE THE
PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEM INTO THE OPERATION OF
GOVERNMENT
Although the drafters of the FOIA recognized the necessity of bal-
ancing the need for a smoothly operating government against the needs
of public access,5 they made no effort to integrate the public informa-
tion system into the overall functioning of the government. Conse-
quently, perhaps the greatest failure of the present information system
is the unnecessary friction between it and other government operations.
The public information system created by the Act, as interpreted by the
courts, focuses only on the release of documents in government files.
The irrebuttable presumption is that free-wheeling disclosure of infor-
mation will always be in the public interest. The drafters did not leave
room for either the courts or the agencies to modify or individualize
this broad public interest determination.6
The only provisions recognizing the necessity of protecting govern-
ment operations are the Act's exemptions. Some of the exemptions,
especially those involving internal documents and investigatory files,
were the result of government operations analysis.7 These exemptions
4. The authors identified two major goals: providing informal discovery for those directly
affected by agency action and informing citizens to enable them to evaluate the performance of
government.
5. 112 CONG. REC. 13007 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Moss), reprintedin Sourcebook I, at 46.
6. Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (even where there is
danger to national security, except in "extreme circumstances"); Wellman Indus., Inc. v. NLRB,
490 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834 (1974); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C.
Cir. 197 1); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971) ("It is not the province of the courts
to restrict that legislative judgment under the guise of judicially balancing the same interests that
Congress has considered"); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965), reprinted in
Sourcebook I, at 36. But see Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 445 F. Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y.), ajdon othergrounds, 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978) (court held that exceptional circum-
stances exist wherein the agency can withhold information not within any exemption).
7. The internal documents exemption attracted the most debate and yet may not be that
important to successful government. Generally, the national security exemption and the statutory
exemption also permit some consideration of the impact of disclosure on government operations.
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could have been used to enable the courts to merge the Information Act
access system into overall government operations. However, even with
a sensitive approach to the needs of government, the Act does not pro-
vide sufficient flexibility to allow the courts to integrate disclosure of
information into the machinery of government.' Curing this failure
will require thoughtful legislative analysis. Initially, Congress must
recognize that evaluation of the Act's performance requires considera-
tion not only of the public interest but also of the Act's overall impact
on the performance of government. At present, the Act interferes with
the government's ability to react to the needs of its citizenry and it has
an adverse impact on individual agency functions. It thus prevents offi-
cials from performing primary duties that Congress has also deemed to
be in the public interest.
A. Questioning the Costs of the Act.
Much of the cost of the system, both in monetary expenses and
harm to government performance, results from the myopic approach of
the legislative plan. At present, the agencies are placed in a public in-
terest dilemma because the drafters of the Act decreed that disclosure
takes precedence over all other possible expenditures and operations.
In a sense, this prime directive makes the cynical bureaucrat's choice
easy: allocation of resources for public disclosure must be given prior-
ity over any other activity. If bureaucrats balk at the present public
information system, it is often because they cannot in good conscience
ignore the value of other functions that this prime directive demands
that they neglect.
Estimating the cost of the public information system is difficult,9
but there can be no doubt that the present information system imposes
a tremendous drain on the public treasury.'0 Advocates of both the
8. But see NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978) (Court expanded the
potential for more sensitivity to other agency functions under exemption seven); Federal Open
Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 99 S. Ct. 2800, 2814 (1979) (recognizing exemp-
tion five protection of information when release would "significantly harm the Government's
monetary functions or commercial interests").
9. Efforts to consider costs versus benefits were made by an Administrative Conference
study, Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom oflnformation Act: A Froposalfor
Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REv. 217 (1971). Emphasis on disclosure was so strong then that
a balanced approach to the problem was impossible.
10. See Hanus & Relyea, A Polcy Assessment of the Privacy Act of 1974, 25 AM. U.L. REv.
555, 590-91 (1976). The costs of the present system are enormous and increasing. In the 1977
annual reports, four agencies reported costs of over $5 million, with the Justice Department lead-
ing at a cost of almost $13 million. 4 AccEss REP. 11 (May 2, 1978). (Experience suggests that
such reported costs greatly understate the real costs.) The costs are not recaptured through fees.
In a 1976 annual report, for example, HEW reported costs of over $5 million but showed fees
collected of only $135,611. 3 AcCEss REP. 8 (May 4, 1977). Fees are paid into the general treas-
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original FOIA and the 1974 amendments successfully covered up the
cost problem." Now the expense of the system has come to light,
partly through annual reports and through agency arguments attempt-
ing to explain unsatisfactory compliance. 2 Even these estimates must
greatly understate the actual cost, because much of the cost is hidden.
Accurate estimates of other expenses not specifically allocated to FOIA
compliance are nearly impossible. For example, much of the cost in-
volves the time of operating staff who are not part of the public infor-
mation apparatus and whose time is rarely included as a FOIA
expense. In addition, the loss of efficiency forced by the interruption of
normal operations for FOIA compliance represents an unknown mone-
tary cost.' 3
ury and are not returned to the agencies. 31 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1976). The most extreme example of
the costs created by the current system involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation and its at-
tempt to respond to the flood of requests occasioned by the 1974 amendments:
A year ago the bureau began its Project Onslaught, which was designed to reduce the
backlog, which by then had grown to almost 8,000 cases. In addition to its other FOIA
and Privacy Act staff, the bureau used as many as 282 special agents at a time and spent
$2.8 million to attack the growing backlog. Although it did not eliminate it, the project
succeeded in reducing it from 7,556 to 4,910 requests in five months.
4 AccEss REP. 3 (Apr. 18, 1978); see "Timeliness and Completeness of FBI Response to Requests
Under Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts Have Improved," GAO Report No. 78-51, Apr.
10, 1978.
11. Neither the House nor the Senate Committee report on the original Act contains any
discussion of cost or even a conclusory statement to the effect that the benefits outweigh the costs.
Congress simply has never recognized that the public information system will result in the expen-
diture of tax dollars. Congressional investigators concluded: "[Aictivities required by this bill
should be carried out by Federal agencies with existing staff, so that significant amounts of addi-
tional funds will not be required." H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in
Sourcebook II, at 129. See also S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1974), reprinted in
Sourcebook II, at 193. The most superficial investigation would have uncovered actual, quantifi-
able cost at substantially more than this unrealistic estimate. The discussion of cost to the public
treasury in the Committee report fills a mere one-half page, most of which discusses compensation
for attorney's fees. As to general costs: "Some additional administrative and salary expenses may
also ensue. . . . It is expected that for the most part the cost of these items can be absorbed by the
agencies' present operating budgets." S. REP. No. 854, supra at 41, reprinted in Sourcebook II, at
193; similar statement in H.R. REP. No. 876, supra at 9, reprinted in Sourcebook II, at 129. These
statements can only be the result of intentional misrepresentation. See also Congressional Review
of Administrative Rulemaking: Hearings on H.. 3658, 8231, and Related Bills Before the Sub-
comm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 253, 269 (statement of Prof. Charles Gellhorn noting Congress' apparent failure to
evaluate accurately the costs of the Privacy Act, which amount to over $1 billion, as opposed to
the original estimated cost of several thousand dollars).
12. Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605, 612 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The court noted that the cost of FOIA compliance by the FBI was $2,675,000 in 1976.
When this cost is multiplied by the number of federal agencies, the total taxpayer cost is startling.
Even this figure must be regarded as low because the FBI is a very small agency with fairly easily
identifiable files. See 4 Accass REP. 9-12 (May 2, 1978).
13. Other unnecessary costs result from inefficiency in the request mechanisms. See, ag.,
Mason v. Callaway, 554 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 877 (1977) (noting the
agencies' good faith effort to comply); Irons v. Gottschalk, 548 F.2d 992 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
PUBLIC INFORM.ATION SYSTEM
Inattention to the cost factor has created a system that cannot
fairly allocate costs to users of the system, but places the entire burden
indiscriminately on all taxpayers. For example, the search fee provi-
sion could be used to impose greater costs on those using the Act for
private interests, but because no distinction is drawn between types of
users--corporations versus individuals-or between uses--citizenry ed-
ucation versus discovery-the search fee recapture has not been ration-
ally related to the public interest value of the request. All fee issues
should be settled by a comprehensive program that considers the public
interest value of each requester and type of request.
14
Inattention to the drain on the public treasury and the problem of
fair allocation of cost is found throughout the entire public information
system. Section 11 of the Advisory Committee Act15 imposes costs on
the government for private interest access. That section provides that
upon request, the government must supply copies of transcripts at
copying costs. The purpose of the provision is to make inexpensive
transcripts available to public interest advocates, but the result is much
different. Before this provision was enacted, large corporations paid
virtually the entire cost of transcripts while the government could ob-
tain transcripts for free. Now, under section 11, the public treasury is
used to subsidize the corporations' litigation expense for transcripts-a
cost of millions of dollars unnecessarily imposed on the public by
poorly drafted legislation. Access to transcripts for public interest ad-
vocates could have been provided by more limited legislation. These
examples suggest only a few of the ways in which the failure to con-
sider cost factors has unnecessarily increased the cost of the informa-
tion system to the public.
B. Questioning the Prime Directive Approach of the Act.
In addition to the monetary expense, the real cost of the Act in-
denied, 434 U.S. 965 (1977) (part of six year quest for patent office unpublished manuscripts in
which the burden of the initial request forced the court to find it unreasonably broad; this case
found the request had been sufficiently narrowed).
14. Such distinctions are, perhaps, even more appropriate for the award of attorney's fees.
Most FOIA litigation does not involve the "noble and deserving champion of the public interest
who comes into court. . . to vindicate the public's right to know and vanquish bureaucratic se-
crecy." Hearings on H.R 542-5-andH.R 4960 Before the Foreign Relations and Government Infor-
mation Subcomm. of the House Comm on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24(1977)
(statement of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General). Some courts have suggested that
the exercise of judicial discretion to award attorney's fees should be guided by the private re-
quests' benefits to the public interest. Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d
704, 711 (D.C. Cir. 1977), following H.R REP. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1974), reprinted in
Sourcebook II, at 227.
15. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 11, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
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eludes a less tangible factor-the burden imposed on each agency's
ability to perform its primary public interest function. The Act in-
structs agencies that their primary duty is to disclose information. No
matter what other functions may suffer, disclosure of information takes
precedence.' 6 It has priority over antitrust enforcement, over educa-
tional grants, over welfare policy, over the apprehension of criminals
and over assuring pure foods and drugs. Disclosure of information is
the prime directive. Because of the persistence of the Act's incursion
into the process of government, a number of very useful activities are
interrupted by pedestrian FOIA activities.
Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force7 forced the
District of Columbia Circuit to recognize and attempt to come to grips
with the practical problems that have been thrust upon the agencies.
The requester challenged the FBI's failure to respond to its FOIA re-
quest within ten days. The district court was sympathetic to the
agency's inability to respond promptly to a backlog of 5,137 requests."
Although the appellate court continued to take a draconian view of the
agency's plight, it had to recognize that it could not order the impossi-
ble. The court found that an agency could be excused from an inflexi-
ble application of the time limits where it showed "exceptional
circumstances" and "due diligence."' 9 The court found further that the
existence of "exceptional circumstances" may be presumed from over-
all operating difficulties and the additional burden imposed by infor-
mation requests. 2 This general finding of unusual circumstances does
not correspond with the language or legislative history of the time limit
provision, but it does recognize the practical limitations of the agencies'
ability to comply.2' "We believe that Congress intended to guarantee
access to Government agency documents on an equal and fair basis.
Good faith and due diligence call for a procedure which is fair overall
16. This predominant emphasis on disclosure extends even to the courts, which are com-
manded to give precedence to FOIA cases. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(D) (1976). The exemptions serve
as the sole source of flexibility. See note 8 supra.
17. 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F. Supp. 174 (D.D.C.
1976); Hayden v. Department of Justice, 413 F. Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976); Note, Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DuKE L.J. 532, 533-38.
18. 547 F.2d at 613. In Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F. Supp. 174, 176 (D.D.C. 1976), the FBI
stated that the number of requests had increased from one per workday in 1973 to 53 per workday
in 1975 and personnel had increased from eight to 161 during that period. Even Attorney General
Levy had to admit that the burden is enormous with some 92 requests each workday. Washington
Post, Apr. 29, 1975, at A2, col. 6. See note 10 supra.
19. 547 F.2d at 610-15; accord, Exner v. FBI, 542 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1976).
20. 547 F.2d at 612.
21. See Hamlin v. Kelley, 433 F. Supp. 180, 182 (N.D. M11 1977) (large number of files is not
an "exceptional circumstance").
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in the particular agency."22 Judge Leventhal, in his concurring opin-
ion, found physical impossibility to be irrelevant in evaluating compli-
ance with the FOIA. Taking a literal approach which more accurately
reflects the congressional intention, he construed the Act to mandate an
interpretation that ignores the impact on governmental operations. "A
court considering a prayer for relief against an agency normally acts in
relation to the case before it without inquiring into the impact of its
order on other activities of the agency."23 If the courts are not to con-
cern themselves with "the impact . . . on other activities of the
agency," then Congress must do so. Thus, Judge Leventhal's approach
would reach the technically correct, but practically absurd, result of
enjoining all other FBI activities until the requests were processed.24
No other FBI function carries so clear a congressional mandate requir-
ing action within a specific time frame.
C. Needfor Broader Perspective.
Many factors lead to inattention to the operation of government,
but the major cause of the neglect is the perspective of designers and
critics of the system. Legislators, commentators and courts stand
outside and hence see only the problems of one seeking information.
In view of this narrow perspective, it is not surprising that any failures
in the system are attributed to the bureaucracy. This viewpoint permits
judgment of government performance only by results and does not
compel searching inquiry into the reasons for these results. To be sure,
recalcitrant officials have diminished the promise of the present system,
but bureaucratic attitudes were never the real problem. Indeed, a great
deal has been accomplished in reforming bureaucratic attitudes toward
information disclosure,25 but the system still does not work satisfacto-
rily.26
22. 547 F.2d at 615.
23. Id. at 621.
24. One commentator suggested that the courts should not worry about the debilitating effect
of the Act on government operations because the breakdown will force Congress to deal with the
problem. Comment, Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force: Reief from the Strict
Time Limits of the Freedom of Information Act, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 603, 614-15. It is hoped that
Congress can be awakened with somewhat less drastic harm to government.
25. See Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1977), where the court refused to
order in camera inspection of documents, relying on the "conscientious manner" and "good faith"
of the agency. "In view of the evident substantial and good faith compliance with the require-
ments of the law.., the Court will take the Commission at its word and not require in camera
inspection." Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 1976-2 Trade Cas. 1 61,231, (D.D.C. 1976); accord,
DiViaio v. Kelley, 571 F.2d 538 (10th Cir. 1978); Bell v. United States, 563 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.
1977).
26. In the experience of the authors, the assumption the outsider makes about bureaucrats is
not only incorrect, but also illogical. Logic would suggest that a cynical bureaucrat would not
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There are serious weaknesses in the Freedom of Information Act
that are not attributable to the motives of government officials. The
major problems stem from structural breakdowns brought about by the
poor design of the system. A broader perspective will provide the
depth of understanding required to devise an access system that effi-
ciently disseminates useful information and optimizes overall public in-
terest. Improving the design of the public information system depends,
to a large extent, on striking the crucial balance between public infor-
mation and other public interest goals.27 The major reason for the im-
balance in the present system is the unwillingness of Congress and the
courts to consider the agencies' difficulties and dilemmas.28
Preliminary factual examination, therefore, must attempt both to
avoid the typical anti-government prejudice and to evaluate the present
system's public interest performance. This can be accomplished by
considering the actions of a hypothetical "right-thinking" agency offi-
cial who wants nothing more than to serve the public and to comply
with the letter and intent of the FOIA. Through this hypothetical bu-
reaucrat, analysis must focus on the structural defects that cannot be
attributed to government employees.
Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC29 is a case that demonstrates the
need for this new framework. Counsel for the company made exten-
sive FOIA requests relating to FTC antitrust litigation against their cli-
ent. They pursued this request all the way to the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia. One judging the agency's performance based
on the circuit court's opinion could not resist the impression that the
oppose disclosure under the present public information system. A cynical bureaucrat would revel
in the FOIA. For him, the Act not only means a larger staff but it also means favorable perform-
ance evaluations from Congress and the public without requiring any action that would disturb
the agency's clientele. Furthermore, the information disclosed does not concern the bureaucrat,
since internal opinions are protected, but deals only with private individuals and companies. In
short, the FOIA means larger staffs, less clientele friction and no real danger to the bureaucrat's
position. The stereotypical bureaucrat depicted in FOIA lore should appreciate the present sys-
tem. If bureaucrats' reactions to the present system were consistent with traditional characteriza-
tion, they would be responding enthusiastically.
27. Gellhorn, 7he Rightto Know: FirstAmendment Overbreadth?, 1976 WAsH. U.L.Q. 25,27-
28.
28. Some cases in which practical difficulties were considered include: Open America v.
Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (number of requests was large
enough to indicate a general "exceptional circumstance"); Vermont Low Income Advocacy Coun-
cil v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1976) (problem of compiling the files requested); Weisberg v.
Department of Justice, 543 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (district court found some of the requests
oppressive, but appellate court disagreed); Cleaver v. Kelley, 415 F. Supp. 174 (D.D.C. 1976)
(request for an estimated 5,800 pages of documents); Hayden v. Department of Justice, 413 F.
Supp. 1285 (D.D.C. 1976) (request for an estimated 18,000 pages of documents). But see Hamlin
v. Kelley, 433 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. M11. 1977).
29. 511 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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agency had "stone-walled" the requester in an effort to cover up some
impropriety. Without a hint of the background of the case, the appel-
late opinion states that "the agency released some documents to Ash
Grove for inspection, but balked at releasing forty-two to which plain-
tiffs demand had been narrowed."3 The natural conclusion from this
statement must be that the agency reluctantly parted with "some" doc-
uments and that the company greatly pared down or "narrowed" its
request. In fact, the company's request encompassed thousands of doc-
uments, nearly all of which were released in response to the original
request. The company did not avail itself of the opportunity to view
these documents until the FTC attorneys mentioned the company's
lack of interest to the district court. The agency found approximately
two hundred documents exempt and sought to withhold those docu-
ments. At the insistence of the district court, the agency permitted the
company to choose from descriptions of exempt documents those it
particularly wanted. This process further "narrowed" the company's
request to forty-two documents rather than the thousands originally re-
quested. The company continued to request access to the exempt docu-
ments withheld, even though no interest had been shown in the
documents already released. Yet, the appellate court's summation of
the FTC efforts states that the agency gave up "some" of the documents
and suggests that the company, rather than the agency, narrowed the
controversial group of documents.
The company here was not interested in open government. It was
using a traditional offensive tool-burdensome demands for irrelevant
and useless information.3" Administrative discovery was denied for
these documents because they were not found relevant. Furthermore,
the company made no effort to use the information nor would it have
been able to do so.3" The apparent intent of the request was to disable
the FTC's ability to enforce the antitrust laws.3
While counsel for the company had a right to use the Act in this
fashion, evaluation of the present public information system must
question whether the public interest is served in such cases. An attor-
ney charged with enforcing the antitrust laws stands defenseless while
attorneys for alleged violators of the antitrust laws use the FOIA for a
30. Id. at 816-17 (emphasis added).
31. See Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLIB Regulation: A Proposal, 90
HAPuv. L. Rav. 1441, 1458 (1977) (parties habitually use motions and petitions to encumber
agency proceedings).
32. Even if the material proved the allegations, the allegations did not show illegal prejudg-
ment. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948).
33. An interview with SEC personnel suggests that they also believe that the FOIA is used
for harassment.
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purpose other than the one for which it was intended. If an antitrust
case is stalled or damaged, the agency bears the blame for lack of dili-
gence or competence. If the agency ignores the prime directive of the
FOIA, it is criticized on that account. Thus, the access problem looks
quite different from the perspective of the agency. This perspective
cannot be ignored in a public information system.
The Act presents the government official with several dilemmas.
When special interests use the Act contrary to the public interest, the
official must comply with the disclosure prescription of the Act while
other public interest functions suffer. In other cases, compliance with
the Act forces an official to ignore a moral duty to protect the privacy
of an individual against the incursions of the Act.34 Thus, in many
cases, noncompliance with the Act may be the alternative actually
more likely to serve the public interest. The net result of the present
Act's insistence on disclosure may well be poorer government than
would result from a better conceived public information system.
The fact that large economic interests benefit most by the Act is
not a conclusive indictment. In economic regulation, the bias against
strong economic powers may result in opposition to anything that aids
powerful economic interests, but to the extent that these interests un-
cover malfeasance in government, they serve the public interest. The
public might be willing to give this advantage to special economic in-
terests in order to improve the participatory rights of attorneys for indi-
viduals less favored by the system, such as veterans or disability
beneficiaries. In any event, the adverse effect of the present system
should be brought into the open. Covert action is not in itself misgov-
ernment. Misgovernment results when the government will not or can-
not serve its citizens. Thus, if the Act produces a breakdown in the
overall system, it produces misgovernment. If it provides another tool
whereby special interests can further their goals at the expense of the
general community interest, then the underlying purpose of the Act has
been violated.
The authors' survey"5 suggests that the present public information
system does indeed adversely affect the ability of the government to act
in the public interest. Unfortunately, the survey does not have the kind
of factual integrity necessary to support any firm conclusions. The de-
sign of the Act made it impossible to obtain the kind of information
necessary for a complete study.36 The survey did uncover enough
34. See text accompanying notes 163-99 infra.
35. See notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text.
36. The Freedom of Information Act does not require agencies to prepare material and
hence, as private citizens, the authors were unable to request the agencies to accumulate the infor-
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proof to confirm the authors' own experience and to urge a special in-
vestigation of the extent to which the present system results in poorer
government. This investigation must examine the manner in which the
system is manipulated for use against the general public. Those who
benefit most from the Act, whether through abusive or legitimate prac-
tices, are large economic interests resisting regulation and law enforce-
ment or those seeking some benefit from the government. The Act
appears to have subsidized this segment of the public in its conflicts
with government operations. If this is true, then the structure of the
present public information system should be revised. At the least, an
affirmative decision should be made that the public is willing to pay
this price for access to agency documents.
D. Failure to Integrate Various Parts of the Public Information
System.
In recent years, open government has been the goal underlying
several efforts to reform government procedures. The legislative efforts
committed to disclosing the processes of government include the Free-
dom of Information Act,37 the Privacy Act,38 the Sunshine Act, 39 the
Advisory Committee Act' and legislation dealing with congressional
committee meetings.41 These various legislative efforts should be
molded together to form a single public information system. Substan-
tial monetary savings and smoother government operations will result
if these separate public information statutes can be merged.
The most glaring failure of integration exists with respect to the
Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. These two Acts have
disparate purposes: the FOIA, disclosure of information; the Privacy
Act, largely the protection of information. Nevertheless, careful draft-
ing would have coordinated these legislative efforts. For example,
when read literally, section 552a(b) of the Privacy Act abrogates its pri-
vacy protection,4 2 because, if limited to the exemptions of the FOIA,
mation needed to draw clearly valid conclusions. Some agencies had existing records that hint at
the way the public information system is used.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
38. Id. § 552a.
39. Id. § 552b.
40. 5 U.S.C. app § 11 (1976).
41. 2 U.S.C. § 190a-l(b) (1970) (repealed, S. Res. 9, § 2, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 CONG.
REc. 19337 (1975)); H. R. Res. 259, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 6713 (1973) (amending
House rules to provide for open committee meetings).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976): "No agency shall disclose ... unless disclosure of the record
would be -
(2) required under section 552 of this title [The Freedom of Information Act]." Professor
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the Privacy Act can only protect citizens against "clearly unwarranted"
invasions of privacy. Fortunately, this literal interpretation has not
been followed and the Privacy Act has been used to protect citizens'
rights to confidential dealings with the government. Nevertheless, this
example serves to demonstrate the need for a comprehensive public
information system in which various goals are related to the different
types of information. All of the public information legislation must be
integrated into a coherent system that will interfere as little as possible
with other functions of government and with citizens' rights.
E. Modifying the Judicial Role.
The FOIA also fails to integrate the judiciary into the public infor-
mation system. Because the drafters did not trust bureaucrats to ad-
minister the system fairly, the Act provides for de novo review. Other,
perhaps more weighty, administrative determinations are subject to
very limited judicial review, rarely including substitution of the court's
judgment on factual issues. The present system, however, expends con-
siderable judicial resources second guessing the agencies on both fact
and law.43 Perhaps, in the beginning, the benefits of de novo review
justified the expense.44 It compelled the courts to give the agencies spe-
cific guidance regarding what information must be released, and it did
not permit them the luxury of abstract opinions or ad hoc rationale.
Now, however, even this value of de novo review has been substan-
tially diminished. The judicial review provision should be changed
from de novo redetermination to limited review so that the courts may
assume their proper function of supervision, rather than duplication of
agency actions.
Not only should the burden on the courts be lessened by narrow-
Davis states that this section eliminates all conflict between the two acts. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW: CAsEs-TExT-PROBLMS 589 (6th ed. 1977). However, it appears to increase the
conflict between the two components of the public information system. "inhere is a clear concep-
tual incompatibility between the two acts which has been resolved in favor of the FOIA. Com-
pared with the mandates for disclosure under the FOIA, the protections of individual privacy
under the Privacy Act are weak indeed.... Hanus & Relyea, A Policy Assessment of the Pri-
vacyAct of 1974, 25 AM. U.L. REV. 555, 590 (1976). See also Comment, The Freedom oflnforma-
tlon Act's Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of1974, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 596, 631
(1976).
43. See Seafarers Int'l Union AFL-CIO v. Baldovin, 508 F.2d 125, 129 (5th Cir. 1975). Some
courts blame the judicial burden on the agencies. See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825-26
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
44. The legislative history merely states that de novo review is provided to prevent the judi-
cial function from becoming a "meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion." S. RE.
No. 813, supra note 6, at 8, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 43. There was no discussion of why
review under one of the traditional standards of review would become "meaningless" in this con-
text as opposed to other areas of judiciary/agency relations.
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ing their factual review responsibility, but judicial enforcement should
be replaced by more administrative monitoring and enforcement.45
Perhaps an administrative agency should be created to assume respon-
sibility for the public information system.' The Act also fails to inte-
grate the judiciary by denying it the flexibility necessary to develop
law. There is no equitable power to go beyond a semantic interpreta-
tion of the Act.47 Professor Davis has argued that the courts should be
permitted discretion to refuse to order disclosure.48 By cutting off that
discretion, the drafters of the Act have eliminated an important source
of legal development.
F. Conclusion.
The most important step Congress must take is a study of the man-
ner in which the Act is actually being used. The Congress has the ben-
efit of over ten years of experience with the Act. This experience,
however, will serve the public interest only if the analysis abandons the
previous myopic perspective and looks at the public information sys-
tem as part of the overall process of government. Careful investigation
and analysis must focus on coordinating public access with existing
governmental operations. The system should advise officials as to pri-
orities and should include statutory language that would add both flex-
ibility and certainty. The public information system should be
designed to provide the most effective access with the least infringe-
ment on the processes of government and on individual rights.
III. THE GOAL OF INFORMAL DISCOVERY AND A BETTER SYSTEM
FOR ACHIEVING THIS GOAL
Although the rhetoric accompanying the Act extols the virtues of
informing the public as to governmental operations in general, an often
overlooked but equally important goal of the Act was to provide a
mechanism for informal discovery in particular cases,49 "[t]o insure
45. Judicial enforcement has been unsatisfactory from the beginning. Giannella, AgencyPro-
cedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposalfor Uniform Regulations, 23
AD. L. REv. 217, 225 (1971).
46. Koch, The Freedom of Information Act: Suggestionsfor Making Information Available to
the Public, 32 MD. L. REv. 189, 220-21 (1972); Miller & Cox, On the NeedFor a National Commis-
sion on Documentary Access, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 213, 228-31 (1976).
47. K. DAVIS, SEVENTIas 61.
48. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 767 (1967).
On rare occasions, the court will support the obvious need for such discretion. Rose v. Depart-
ment of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 269 (2d Cir. 1974), af'd, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); Caplan v.
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 445 F. Supp. 699 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'don other grounds, 587
F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978).
49. Clearly, other goals were contemplated, including improved participant access in infor-
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that no citizen will be denied full access to data that may be of crucial
importance to his case."50 Much of the factual material uncovered in
the congressional hearings prior to passage of the Act concerned deni-
als of individual requests for specific information necessary to deal
with an agency or information that was being used by the agency for
some action concerning that individual.51 This record suggests that
Congress was concerned with providing an individual with information
necessary to protect his interests in dealings with the government.
Under prior law, an individual citizen dealing with the govern-
ment could not obtain information relevant to certain governmental
actions having a direct impact on his case. The excuses available under
old section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) were used to
shield the government against informed challenge by such citizens.52
The elimination of these exemptions was designed to achieve open gov-
ernment and also to provide a means by which persons affected by in-
formal government processes could obtain the information necessary to
participate in those informal proceedings and to defend their private
interests.
To a large extent, however, a system for providing citizens with
general information about the way government operates differs from an
access system designed to satisfy the need for informal discovery. A
major structural weakness of the FOIA lies in the fact that it represents
an attempt to solve two very different information problems through
one scheme. Access necessary to participation can be limited for the
sake of effective government without denying meaningful participation.
These limitations may be inappropriate to a citizen education system.
Consequently, this Article examines the goal of informal discovery and
alternative mechanisms for achieving that goal independent of the
other goals of a public information system.
A. Use of the Act to Provide Informal Administrative Discovery.
Regardless of the drafters' intent, the Act is in fact used primarily
mal proceedings. K. DAvis, SEvENTIES 62-63. Butsee Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing
Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974), suggesting that the "stress" of the legislative history behind the Act was an.
informed public. Accord, NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 1977);
Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("The FOIA was fundamentally
designed to inform the public and not to benefit private litigants").
50. 112 CONo. REc. 13645 (1966) (remarks of Rep. King).
51. The salient features of the legislative history are an over-abundance of rhetoric and a
dearth of factual material. One can readily support the rhetoric but condemn the drafters for not
insisting on more specific information regarding the use of the various exemptions.
52. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1966), reprintedin Sourcebook I, at 26-27.
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as a device for informal discovery.53 The authors found this to be over-
whelmingly the case in their experience at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. A survey of other selected agencies confirmed that the Act is
much more often used as a discovery device by those having some deal-
ing with the government than it is used to obtain general information
about the functioning of the government. 54 The FDA, the SEC and the
53. Hearings on S. 1142, supra note 3, at 101 (statement of Harrison Weliford, Center for the
Study of Responsive Law) (survey of litigation indicates that the primary beneficiaries are private
corporate interests, and secondary public interest representatives; the press and average citizens
rarely use the Act). Examples from 1977 FOIA litigation include: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp.
Auth. v. Perry, 571 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1978); AMF Head Div. of AMF, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.2d
374 (10th Cir. 1977) (employee affidavits); Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724
(5th Cir. 1977), rep'd, 437 U.S. 214 (1978); United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1977)
(defendant in narcotics prosecution could obtain records from Bureau of Prisons under FOIA);
Cooper v. Department of the Navy, 558 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977) (request by attorney for crash
victim investigating possible wrongful death action against manufacturer); NLRB v. Hardeman
Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977) (company requested employee affidavits obtained in
conjunction with an unfair labor practice investigation); Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB,
556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977) (employer attempted to obtain employee union authorization cards in
order to challenge support for a union); Mason v. Callaway, 554 F.2d 129 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 877 (1977) (employee discharged from the Panama Canal Corporation requested docu-
ments from various agencies); Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (request for
information from the Defense Contract Audit Agency); New England Medical Center Hosp. v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1977) (employer asked for Board's open and closed investigative
files relating to an unfair labor practice charge); United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1977) (request for IRS documents to show selective enforcement); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving,
548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977) (employer guilty of unfair labor practice requested NLRB docu-
ments in order to determine amount of back pay due). The predominance of the NLRB as a
defendant in FOIA cases can best be explained by the fact that the Board has almost no discovery
procedures.
54. In order to obtain the necessary information, representative agencies were surveyed.
Agencies chosen were: Justice Department (Civil Rights Division and Antitrust Division); Patent
Office; Federal Power Commission (now Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of
Energy); Department of Commerce (Economic Development Administration); Civil Aeronautics
Board; Federal Communications Commission; Internal Revenue Service; Food and Drug Admin-
istration; National Endowment for the Humanities; National Science Foundation; Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (Office of Education and Office of Human Development); Veter-
ans Administration; Bureau of Indian Affairs; Department of Agriculture (Food and Nutrition
Service); Federal Maritime Administration; International Trade Commission; Consumer Product
Safety Commission; Interstate Commerce Commission; National Labor Relations Board; and Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. The following information was requested:
(1) Copies of annual reports submitted to Congress pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552(d)
(Supp. V 1975) for calendar years 1975 and 1976;
(2) Breakdown of requests received in the past calendar year (or any convenient record
period) according to the following categories:
a. Types of information requested.
b. Types of requests broken down, if possible, into the following categories:
1. Media, including trade journals;
2. Individuals and corporations, the subject of agency proceedings, investiga-
tions or other activities, including their attorneys;
3. General public;
4. Organizations or individuals holding themselves out as representing the
general public or acting as "private attorneys general";
5. Scholars;
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FCC all reported that an overwhelmingly high percentage of requests
come from regulated corporations and those representing corpora-
tions.55 While the survey was biased in favor of agencies that deal pri-
marily with business enterprises, the authors nevertheless feel that the
conclusions are justified. Large economic special interests receive the
bulk of the Act's benefit. They not only use the Act to protect them-
selves against government regulation but also to interfere with govern-
6. Corporations or business entities.
c. Types of information requested, broken down, if possible, into the following
categories:
1. Internal agency memoranda;
2. Commercial, financial, or other information submitted to the agency by in-
dividuals or corporations, the subject of agency proceedings, investigations
or other activities;
3. Other categories of requested information.
(3) Copies of examples of typical requests and agency responses thereto, both initially
and on appeal. If "typical" requests could not be provided conveniently, copies of
the 25 most recent requests decided by the agency, including copies of the re-
sponses, were requested.
Many of these agencies cooperated with the requests, especially the Department of Justice
and the Food and Drug Administration. A few agencies, notably the FDA, offered data in sub-
stantial compliance. However, most agencies could not supply the information broken down ac-
cording to the requested categories. Due to the purpose of the study, the authors were particularly
interested in data with respect to who was using the Act and for what purpose. Instead, the agen-
cies offered what they had, including copies of their own logs which were very useful in deriving
information of sufficient accuracy.
From this admittedly inadequate evidence, it was found that the primary beneficiaries of the
Act are large corporations and their representatives who have some business with the government.
The study also suggests that the Act is not used to acquire general information about how the
government is working, but rather for discovery relating to particular controversies with the gov-
ernment. At the FDA, 81% of the requests come from members of regulated industry. Strong
support for this theory also came from interviews with the agencies' public information specialists.
It was noted that the agencies that do not have recognizable clientele groups or that have unso-
phisticated and underfinanced clientele groups had little contact with the FOIA. If it were true
that the Act is used to gain general information regarding governmental operations, some of these
agencies, for example, HEW, would be natural targets of the Act. However, one agency spokes-
man concluded that the Act worked well in HEW. Given the agency, it may be that the Act fills
the need, noted above, for some discovery in informal action. Regardless, this agency has no large
economic interests to contend with and hence its experience can be contrasted with that of the
economic regulatory agencies. That the Act benefits large economic interests would seem predict-
able: these citizens most often deal with the government and have the resources to use the ineffi-
cient process of the FOIA.
55. FDA Figures
Nature of party making request Percentage of total
FOI service companies 34%
Industry 36
Lawyers 11
Individuals 8
Public Interest Groups 4
Press 3
Other 4
PUBLIC INFORMA4TION SYSTEM
ment officials in the performance of their duties. 6 While private
individuals are not precluded from using the Act in this manner, practi-
cality dictates against widespread use by ordinary citizens. They have
neither the knowledge nor the resources to use the Act in this manner,
SEC Figures
Nature of party making request
Law firms
Individuals
Corporations
Media
Public Interest
Universities
State and local government
Congressional committees or
independent members
Number of
requests
429
118
99
55
10
10
6
3
Percentage of
total
58%
16
13
7
1.36
1.36
.82
.41
Total FCC figures-172 total requests, 109 (63%) from law firms or corporations. This infor-
mation was compiled by these regulatory agencies in response to a questionnaire sent by the Sen-
ate Committee on Government Operations.
The less complete information from other agencies also supports conclusions as to the iden-
tity of requesters. The chart below shows a percentage breakdown of FOIA user data.
Agency
FDA*o
SEC0
FCC0
FPC**
CAB**
HEW**
NSF***
USDA**
COMMERCE**
(Econ. Develop.)
Commerce***
(Maritime)
Int'l Trade***
CPSC**
ICC**
Civil Rights***
Subject Corp. (Not
Agency of Subject of
Proceed- Agency
ing+ Proc.)
11%
58% (429)
53% (92)
4% (1)
26% (6)
10% (4)
6% (9)
29% (7)
Private
General Attorney
Public General
8%
16% (121)
19% (33)
20% (5)
39% (9)
27% (11)
12% (17)
42% (10)
21% (4) 32% (6) 11% (2)
21% (6)
72% (31)
60% (6)
83% (5)
4.5 (18)
32% (9)
16% (7)
10% (1)
0% (0)
2% (8)
43% (12)
9% (4)
10% (1)
0% (0)
82% (328)
4%
2.2% (16)
10% (17)
0% (0)
13% (3)
0% (0)
2% (3)
0% (0)
Media Scholar
3%
7% (55)
7.5 (13)
8% (2)
4% (1)
17% (7)
37%-*(53)
85 (2)
5% (1) 32% (6)
0% (0) 4% (1)
0% (0) 2% (1)
0% (0) 20% (2)
16% (1) 0% (0)
9.5 (38) 1% (5)
0% (0)
1.4% (10)
0% (0)
16%(4)
4% (1)
17% (7)
28% (41)
8% (2)
0% (0)
0% (0)
0% (0)
0% (0)
0% (0)
.2 (1)
+ Includes requests from attorneys and law firms.
* Agency did not supply raw data. Figures did not indicate whether all requestors were sub-
jects of agency proceedings, thus column #2 includes requests from corporations and FOI
service companies presumably servicing regulated corporations.
** Figures compiled by Mary A. Magnuson, Research Assistant, from sample letters provided
by agency.
Figures compiled by Mary A. Magnuson, Research Assistant, based on daily log supplied by
agency.
0 Data compiled for Senate Committee on Government Operations covering period 7/1/75
through 6/30.
00 Included many requests from same individual.
000 The Federal Power Commission policy is to treat each request for information as a FOIA
request, thus distorting the information received.
56. See text accompanying notes 25-35 supra.
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and could not afford the time or expense of having someone sort
through massive numbers of documents for relevant information. Con-
sequently, the FOIA has become an informal discovery device used
primarily to the advantage of small groups with economic power and to
the disadvantage of the general public.57
The use of the Act as a discovery tool is the result of the general
lack of adequate discovery in the administrative process. Participants
in agency proceedings must otherwise rely on the discovery rules of
those agencies that have deigned to permit discovery. Denial of infor-
mal discovery does not appear to be a denial of due process, at least
where there is no harm to participatory rights.58 Thus, at present, the
failure of an agency to provide for compulsory process, even in formal
adjudication, does not violate due process, 59 nor is there any general
statutory guarantee making compulsory process or other forms of dis-
covery available.6 0 The APA neither guarantees compulsory process
nor empowers agencies to issue subpoenas, but merely provides that a
subpoena shall be issued to a party where an agency already has sub-
poena authority. This provision is designed to place the agency and
private parties on an equal footing.6 2
57. Nationwide Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. Sampson, 559 F.2d 704, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The court attributed this result to the imbalance of financial resources. It is argued below that the
whole scheme of the Act dictates this result. It cannot be adjusted merely by awarding attorney
fees in a vain attempt to restore a financial balance.
58. See Silverman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 549 F.2d 28, 34 (7th Cir. 1977)
(denial of information available under the FOIA did not deprive a participant of due process in a
formal adjudicative proceeding).
59. See Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1912); Ubiotica Corp. v. FDA, 427
F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1970).
60. See NLRB v. Seine & Line Fishermen's Union, 374 F.2d 974, 982 n.10 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967) (refusal to issue a subpoena not necessarily prejudicial); Campbell v.
Eastland, 307 F.2d 478,490-92 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) (trial court abused
its discretion by rendering judgment for taxpayer simply because the government would not allow
discovery). But see FTC v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 304 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (D.D.C.
1969) (in FTC adjudication, party has right to a subpoena "on a showing of general relevance and
reasonable scope of the evidence sought"). See generaly I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRAT VE LAW
TREATISE § 8.15 (1958); K. DAVIs, SEVENTIES 298.
61. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976). Agencies uniformly lack power to enforce their own subpoenas
and must seek enforcement in the courts. The Constitution and considerations of fundamental
fairness require this bifurcation of power. United States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d
638, 641 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Note, Discovery in FederalAdministrative Proceedings, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 1035, 1076 (1964). Sanctions for failure to comply with a discovery order are unclear
under APA § 9(a), 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (1976), and depend on individual enabling acts. Note, supra,
at 1051, 1054-55.
62. The purpose of this provision is to make agency subpoenas available to private parties to
the same extent as to agency representatives. It should be emphasized that § 6(c) of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976), relates only to the existing subpoena powers conferred upon agencies; it
does not grant power to issue subpoenas to agencies that are not so empowered by other statutes.
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However, even this equality is somewhat illusory, because agencies
may possess investigative powers to compel disclosure of information
or filing of reports that are not available to private persons.63 The APA
expressly recognizes that many agencies are empowered to make inves-
tigative demands that are separate and distinct from any compulsory
process available in conjunction with specific proceedings.64 These in-
vestigative powers may be exceedingly broad,65 with little provision for
judicial supervision.66
The FOIA provides de facto discovery for participants in informal
administrative processes since the agency cannot limit access to infor-
mation that falls within the scope of the Act. The judicial opinions
construing the Act show a much greater inclination to allow access to
agency files than do judicial interpretations of the ordinary discovery
provisions. On the other hand, while use of the FOIA for discovery
purposes has not been proscribed, some courts have taken a dim view
of efforts to use the Act as a substitute for discovery.67 Nevertheless, in
ATORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 67-69 (1947). See
Tomlinson, Discover, in Agency.4djudication, 1971 DUKE L.J. 89, 104 n.65.
63. See Tomlinson, supra note 62, at 124-25. See also Papercraft Corp. v. FTC, 307 F. Supp.
1401, 1404 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (participant has no right to reports furnished to agency under author-
ity separate from subpoena power, even though participant alleged that the FTC investigative
powers had been used as a "tool of litigation" in the particular agency adjudication).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1976).
65. While the APA limits the scope of investigative demands by the language "as authorized
by law," many agencies possess broad authority to issue investigative requests. See, e.g., United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (an agency's investigative request will be
enforced even if motivated by "nothing more than official curiosity"); EEOC v. University of
N.M., 504 F.2d 1296, 1303 (10th Cir. 1974) (administrative subpoenas enforceable unless "plainly
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose").
66. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946); FTC v. Feld-
man, 532 F.2d 1092, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally K. DAVIS, SEVENTIES 296-302.
67. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tfre & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214 (1978); Renegotiation Bd.
v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); Columbia Packing Co. v. USDA, 563 F.2d 495,
499 (1st Cir. 1977) (FOIA should not be used for discovery purpose, but for purposes with broader
public interest); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); Title Guarantee
Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976) ("It is significant that it
is never suggested in the legislative history of the 1974 amendment to the FOIA that any such
modification of agency discovery rules was intended"); Freuhauf Corp. v. Thornton, 507 F.2d
1253, 1254 (6th Cir. 1974) ("the Freedom of Information Act was not intended to serve as a substi-
tute for criminal discovery"); National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 193 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Lincoln Nat'l Bank v. Lampe, 421 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Verrazzano Trading
Corp. v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1401, 1403 (Cust. Ct. 1972); accord, United States v. Mur-
dock, 548 F.2d 599, 601-02 (5th Cir. 1977). But see K. DAVIS, SEVENTIES 63 (contending that
FOIA was intended to benefit party in an agency proceeding as well as to compel disclosure to the
electorate); Comment, Taxpayers Discovery in Civil Federal Tax Controversies, 51 NEB. L. REv.
290, 294 (1971). See also Federal Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 99 S. Ct.
2800 (1979) (incorporating ordinary discovery exemption into FOIA through exemption five).
The FTC attempts to separate the FOIA from discovery by channeling discovery through
administrative law judges (in accordance with traditional procedures) and FOIA requests through
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agency proceedings where discovery is limited, the FOIA may fill an
important void.6"
Clearly, there is a substantial need to cure the massive gaps in dis-
covery available under the current administrative process. However, it
is unfortunate that the FOIA has assumed this role. Unlimited discov-
ery has never been advocated even in formal proceedings. Many of the
defects in the present public information system could be cured by con-
sidering the public education problem separately from the discovery
problem.69
B. Improving the Public Information System by Separate Treatment of
Informal Discovery.
1. The FOIA and Discoveryfor Informal Actions. Discovery is
necessary for effective participation in agency proceedings:70 it maxi-
mizes the ability of an interested person to represent his interest and
consequently assures greater information upon which an agency may
base its decision. Compulsory process not only provides a tool whereby
an interested person may gather more information, it also permits an
interested person the opportunity to confront the information which is
to be used against him. Yet, the power to compel the availability of
information is denied to most persons who participate in agency pro-
ceedings. The Supreme Court has required that the targets of all vari-
eties of informal administrative action be given essential participatory
rights;7' a means of compelling information would seem to be a neces-
sary complement to this right.72
Although the ability to obtain information is essential to participa-
tion, it is equally important that the mechanisms by which participants
obtain information be compatible with the administrative process. In-
agency-wide FOIA processes. For an example of this procedure, see J.J. Newberry Co., 30 Ad.
L.2d 816 (FTC 1972); Hearst Corp., 30 Ad. L.2d 92 (FTC 1971). A similar approach is suggested
in Hamilton, Rulemaking On A Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEx. L. REV.
1132, 1175 (1972). But see United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 1977) (court
refused to require a criminal defendant to undertake separate civil FOIA litigation to obtain ac-
cess).
68. See Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 352 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
rev'd, 415 U.S. 1 (1974) (the renegotiation process does not include the availability of discovery).
69. See text accompanying notes 70-96 infra.
70. See NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1977) (court recog-
nized the unfairness of withholding employee affidavits from employer/litigant).
71. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See
generally Note, Procedural Due Process After Goss v. Lopez, 1976 DuKE L.J. 409.
72. See K. DAVIS, TREATISE, supra note 60, at § 8.15 (citing cases for both sides of the propo-
sition that discovery is a requisite element of fairness). The need for compulsory mechanisms
would seem to vary with each individual informal process. Id.
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formal discovery must have practical boundaries. The present disclo-
sure system intentionally provides virtually no boundaries. Nor does it
provide any room for either the agencies or the courts to integrate the
discovery system into the agency process.7 3 The FOIA does not permit
the agency to distinguish between requesting parties: it requires disclo-
sure to "any person."'74 From a requesting party's point of view, the
Act is the perfect discovery device: the agency cannot limit access to
information by requiring a showing of need,75 reasonable scope or rele-
vancy to a proceeding. This breadth is a disaster from an agency, and a
public interest, point of view. It burdens the public treasury with con-
siderable expense and interferes with the agencies' abilities to perform
their primary functions.
The paramount public interest dictates that discovery in informal
actions should not be permitted to interfere with or interrupt the nor-
mal administrative process.76 Discovery related to informal processes
must be limited in the same way as discovery in formal adjudications-
by balancing the potential needs of participants against the needs of the
process. Because the drafters of the Act were committed to informing
the electorate at all costs, they did not consider the implications of an
unbridled discovery system. No other discovery mechanism exists
without boundaries. For example, the drafters of the Administrative
Procedure Act restricted administrative discovery by explicitly requir-
ing relevance and proper scope.7 And, in a formal adjudicative proc-
ess, the presiding officials, even without explicit authority, can protect
the process from destructive discovery.78 Yet, with respect to informal
decisionmaking where efficiency is often the essence of fairness, the
73. Neither the courts nor the agencies have discretion to withhold documents. K. DAVIS,
SEVENTIES, 61. But see Caplan v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 445 F. Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y.), aj'don othergrounds, 587 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1978) (in exceptional circumstances, court
of equity has discretion to deny disclosure).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
75. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S.
214 (1978) ("anyone's case is as strong (or as weak) as anyone else's"); Cooper v. Department of
the Navy, 558 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1977) (court noted that the agency supplied all the informa-
tion needed for discovery but that need could not limit the access). But see Federal Open Mkt.
Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Merrill, 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979) (using exemption five to delay
release of information if immediate release would significantly harm Government's monetary
functions or commercial interests); Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 547
F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976), and its progeny which reinstate need as an excuse relative to deadlines.
76. See, e.g., New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 384 (1st Cir. 1976)
(in camera inspection should not be ordered if it would "trap the Board into foregoing all claims
to exemptions under FOIA if it is not to accept crippling delays in the prosecution of unfair
practice cases while litigating the exemptions in court").
77. 5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976).
78. Id. § 556(c).
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FOIA discovery system has no bounds and the processes are in no way
protected from its excesses.
Old section 3 of the APA79 was clearly intended to provide infor-
mal discovery for those "properly and directly concerned" with agency
action. Proposals to amend section 3 were precipitated by the realiza-
tion that section 3 had become not a disclosure provision, but rather a
statutory excuse for withholding government records."0 Agencies could
withhold information if secrecy was required "in the public interest" or
if the records related "solely to the internal management of an
agency."' I Information could also be held confidential "for good cause
found," and even where no good cause could be found for secrecy or
confidentiality, the records were available only to persons "properly
and directly concerned." 2 These broad phrases were not defined in the
section nor in its legislative history, and there was no provision for re-
view of an agency's wrongful denial of access to the records. In sum,
section 3 was a disclosure statute only to the extent desired by the agen-
cies, and they were not so inclined. There was nothing, however, inher-
ently wrong with these limitations. Indeed, they represented a clear
understanding that informal discovery must be closely confined. What
was lacking was action by the agencies and the courts to incorporate in
these general standards the discovery necessary to provide "persons
properly and directly concerned" 3 with adequate information to par-
ticipate in the great variety of informal processes.
In response to bureaucratic abuse of that provision, no concept of
"need" or participation was included in the Freedom of Information
Act amendment to the APA.84 Yet, the drafters of the FOIA did not
79. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237. Section 3 provided:
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States requiring
secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal management
of an agency-
(c) PUBLIC RECORDS.-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official
record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to personsproperl, and
directly concerned except information held confidential/or good case found. (emphasis
added).
80. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, APA, LEGisLATiVE HIsToRY, S. Doc. No. 248,79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1946). "Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act... though titled
'Public Information' and clearly intended for that purpose, has been used as an authority for
withholding, rather than disclosing, information. Such a 1800 turn was easy to accomplish given
the broad language of [section 3]." H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 4, reprinted in
Sourcebook 1, at 25. See also Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Sec-
tion of the Administrative Procedure Act (1967), reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 194.
81. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Davis, supra note 48, at 765-66 (criticizing broad access without requiring a reason).
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totally ignore practical governmental problems. Concern for the com-
patibility of the information system with the entire operation of govern-
ment manifests itself in the Act's exemptions. 85 The Act grants
complete information access to any person and then withdraws,
through the exemptions, specific categories of documents. The exemp-
tions represent Congress' intuitive sense of the protection necessary for
governmental operation. The weakness of this approach is that it fo-
cuses on types of documents rather than on specific needs of partici-
pants in various decisionmaking processes. Consequently, a person
may have access to masses of government documents regardless of the
damage it may do to the decisionmaking process, but may not have
access to exempt documents even if great need or substantial impact
can be shown.
By separating the question of participant access, interested persons
could have much greater access, limited by standards developed from
notions of need, interest, relevancy and reasonable scope. An access
system designed specifically for informal discovery would serve partici-
pants at considerable savings to the public treasury and would result in
more efficient agency decisionmaking. Similarly, another system
designed specifically for citizen education functions would result in
more information actually reaching the public with far less damage to
government. 6
The Privacy Act, for example, is a more effective legislative effort
than the FOIA, because Congress focused more closely on a single ac-
cess problem. While the Privacy Act is still too broad in concept,87 it
does demonstrate that sound access legislation requires separate treat-
ment of individual access needs. The drafters attempted to strike a bal-
ance between the requester's need for the information and the effect of
that access upon government operations. The Privacy Act's advantage
over the FOIA is that the Privacy Act focuses on specific types of infor-
mation and those with a specific need for that information.
In addition to the unnecessary burdens imposed on government
operations and the failure to provide access based on need, the FOIA is
deficient as a discovery device because it fails to provide protection for
those supplying information to the government. The disclosure of con-
fidential information is not only unfair, but also damages the decision-
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). See, e.g., Federal Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
v. Merrill, 99 S. Ct. 2800 (1979).
86. See text accompanying notes 106-62 infra.
87. Experience teaches that at least the personal access provision could have been limited to
intelligence and criminal justice agencies. Belair, Less Government Secrecy and More Personal
Privacy? Experience with the Freedom of Information and Privacy 4cts, 4 Civ. LiB. REv. 10, 18
(1977).
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making process. A viable discovery system must include methods for
protecting confidential information, especially where the information
must come from voluntary sources. Yet, there is no room for develop-
ing these devices in the informal discovery scheme of the FOIA. No
assurance of confidentiality is per se enforceable under the Act.8"
2. Designing a System for Discovery in InformalActions. Many
problems could be cured by agency procedural rules specifically
designed to create an informal discovery system that meets the particu-
lar needs of each individual agency's informal process. 89 Unfortu-
nately, the present Act does not provide sufficient flexibility to permit
the development of such rules. However, cases demonstrate that judi-
cial review of agency FOIA rules offers a viable means of both permit-
ting the necessary discretion to develop participant access and
confining and controlling that discretion. 90
An access system used primarily as a discovery tool should be
designed for that purpose. Concepts such as relevancy and reasonable
scope must be incorporated. Officials and the courts should be permit-
ted to protect the public interest from abusive discovery. On the other
hand, improved access for participants in informal administrative
processes is also required. In some circumstances, for example, agen-
cies should be required to answer questions,91 and in some cases par-
88. Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576 (D.D.C. 1976); Tax Analysts
and Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modfled, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(the government's promise of confidentiality does not override the disclosure provisions). But see
Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), a i'd, 460 F.2d 671 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 966 (1972); S. REP. No. 813, supra note 6, at 9, reprintedin Sourcebook I, at 44;
H. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 10, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 31. In Usery v. Whitin
Machine Works, Inc., 554 F.2d 498, 503-04 (1st Cir. 1977), the court even refused to grant a
declaratory judgment that the agency's assurance of confidential treatment covered exempt mater-
ials and hence would protect the information subpoenaed by the agency in an enforcement pro-
ceeding. The persons submitting the material must gamble that if they disclose information which
they consider confidential, a future FOIA proceeding will hold the information to be exempt.
89. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Procedural rulemaking is exempt from notice and comment proce-
dure, but this is a situation where notice and comment should be provided.
90. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NRC, 555 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1977) (court reviewed agency
rules providing for public inspection of arguably exempt information). See, e.g., Harvey's Wagon
Wheel v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1976) (the court was able to review the agency's
disclosure policy as to a specific group of documents because it had a disclosure rule to review).
91. The FOIA does not require an agency to create records, but. only to disclose those in
existence. See Nolen v. Rumsfeld, 535 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977)
(in an effort to require disclosure of missing records, the court found that the FOIA only com-
pelled disclosure of existing records). However, contrary to the clear language of the Act and
these interpretations, some courts have ordered the agency to answer interrogatories submitted
pursuant to the FOIA. Weisberg v. Department of Justice, 543 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1976). There
is a fine line between responses to questions and legitimate interrogatories used as a discovery
device.
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ticipants should be able to obtain essential information not contained
in government files. Neither of these types of information is available
to participants under the present Act.
An informal discovery system should incorporate public interest
priorities that weigh the needs of the participant against the need for
fair and efficient governmental decisionmaking. Because no distinction
has been drawn in the present Act between general groups of reques-
ters, the agencies and courts have been forced to formulate priorities in
the less rational context of individual cases. 92 In Open America v.
Watergate Special Prosecution Force,93 the court, while approving a
"first in, first out" approach to handling the overwhelming load, stated
that priority should be given to requesters who "show a genuine need
and reason for urgency." 94 This "genuine need" is generally based on
a finding that the requested information will be used in some proceed-
ing in which the requester has a direct interest.95 Considerations of
need have also been compelled in the exemption six cases, and in sev-
eral recent exemption seven cases. Thus, despite the clear intent of
Congress, courts simply have not been able to avoid considerations of
need.
An informal discovery system can improve government decision-
making: the more information participants have, the better equipped
they will be to represent their interests and, hence, agency decisions
will be based upon a more complete record. However, the mere crea-
tion of devices to open up relevant government files to participant ac-
cess is not enough. The devices must insure that this access does not
interfere with the agencies' public interest functions.96 The solution lies
in examining each agency's process, or groups of very similar agency
processes, and cautiously building the new discovery procedures into
each system. The undertaking must begin by having each agency ex-
amine its various processes and recommend mechanisms for improving
participant access. Specifically focused administrative rulemaking and
legislation should fill the gaps found in the current administrative dis-
covery system. A separate solution will be required for the citizen edu-
cation problem.
92. Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DUKE L.J. 532,
537-38.
93. 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 615-16.
95. But see Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. Department of Justice, 39 Ad. L.2d 1133 (D.D.C. 1976).
In Kramer v. Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice, 40 Ad. L.2d 7 (D.D.C. 1976), Kramer requested the
material in order to comment on a consent order negotiated by the Department of Justice.
96. Weighing this balance is a necessity for strong informal procedure. Verkuil, 4 Study of
Informal Adjudication Procedures, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 739 (1976).
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C. Other Overlooked Problems with the Present Informal Discovery
System.
The commingling of disparate access goals has created another se-
rious practical problem related to discovery. The link between inade-
quate discovery and the FOIA has resulted in efforts to stay the
proceedings for purposes of which the information is sought.97 In view
of the link between the request and a specific process, the requester
may argue that the proceeding should be held in abeyance until the
information is received. 98 It is surprising that some courts, most nota-
bly the District of Columbia Circuit, have ordered such stays even
though it is well established that interlocutory appeals of denial of dis-
covery are usually improper. Substantial controversy has arisen over
whether courts should stay agency proceedings until a final determina-
tion of the FOIA request has been made. Although the Supreme Court
has not yet stayed any proceedings, it has refused to eliminate the pos-
sibility that it might do so in a proper case.99 This position is probably
correct: stays should be considered, but only reluctantly granted. A
court should be reluctant to encumber informal adjudications with dis-
covery mechanisms that bring them to a halt. The long term solution
to this problem lies with development of a separate informal discovery
system.
Unfortunately, two extremely complex access problems that
should be left to individualized discovery devices have been incorpo-
rated into the public education system: access to criminal investigatory
files and the policing of the designation of classified information. The
drafters of the Act failed to recognize the natural distinction between
criminal investigatory files and civil files, 00 and consequently, did not
provide any special treatment for criminal fies. However, an impor-
tant public policy rationale exists for affording greater protection to
criminal investigatory files '0 through a restrictive exemption. Not
only must the government's criminal investigatory function be pro-
97. The absence of adequate discovery processes even in formal proceedings has resulted in a
rash of FOIA requests in the nature of discovery against the NLRB. See note 53 supra.
98. E.g., Columbia Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture, 563 F.2d 495, 500 (1st Cir.
1977) (district court had enjoined the proceeding until a FOIA decision could be made in court).
99. "As a general rule, it is agreed that courts considering FOIA requests possess the jurisdic-
tion to enjoin agency proceedings pending disposition of the FOLA claim." Note, Developments
Under the Freedom of Information Act-1976, 1977 DuKE L.J. 532, 555 (citations omitted). See
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1974).
100. See H. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 11, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 32; Note, The
Freedom of Information Act-A Potential Alternative to Conventional Criminal Discovery, 14 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1976).
101. Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 50 F.R.D. 130, 132-33 (D.D.C. 1970).
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tected, but the individual rights of those involved in criminal investiga-
tions must also be safeguarded. No valid reason exists for allowing
public access to files compiled in the investigation of a possible individ-
ual criminal activity."0 2 Only the individuals actually covered by the
investigation need access to these files, 10 3 and the Privacy Act fulfills
this need. Different policy considerations are involved in the question
of whether to release civil investigatory files.
Similarly, the classified document problem is much too sophisti-
cated to be handled by a few lines in exemption one of the Freedom of
Information Act.1 4 The Act contains no provision for requester justifi-
cation. However, where potential state secrets are involved, some bal-
ancing must precede release. Because it is not always clear whether
certain information should be classified as a state secret, need is a fac-
tor that should be considered in determining whether to release the in-
formation. In addition, discovery includes numerous devices that
would allow a person to obtain the benefits of confidential information
without actually releasing that information. For example, special ac-
cess could be given to independent, but "cleared," experts who could
then testify based upon the information made available. The general
public should not be denied access to information by precipitous use of
the "secret" stamp. The optimal solution would provide internal proce-
dures for granting "secret" status and adequate procedures for policing
that status. Congress should, of course, continue to monitor this proc-
ess.
Under exemption one, the courts have shown admirable restraint
in refraining from involvement in the classification process. 05 Courts
have traditionally been reluctant to review executive determinations of
the need for secrecy and that policy appears to be based upon sound
judgment. While the federal judiciary can certainly be trusted with
sensitive material, the courts do not have the top security machinery
102. See, e.g., Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Criminal inves-
tigatory files should not be available to the general public unless the parties wish to make them
available. Some special access should be available to the target of the criminal investigation.
103. See, e.g., Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Bell v. United States, 563 F.2d
484 (1st Cir. 1977) (although the documents involved were thirty years old, the court did not feel
comfortable in making a national security decision, and refused in camera inspection); Phillippi v.
CIA, 546 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
104. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1953); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Wolfe v. Froehlke, 510 F.2d 654,
655 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit was reluctant to release sensitive information that might
have an impact on foreign affairs when such information did not fall within the "state secret"
concept. Stone v. Export-Import Bank of United States, 552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1977).
105. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1369 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975).
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required to provide adequate protection for secret information. Even
affidavits cause problems because it is often difficult to describe the ma-
terial adequately for purposes of argument and of judicial review with-
out disclosing the contents of the material. Thus, administrative review
by expert government officials under judicially reviewable administra-
tive standards should be preferred over de novo judicial review. This
problem should also be dealt with in a separate legislative and adminis-
trative program.
IV. THE GOAL OF AN INFORMED PUBLIC AND THE STRUCTURAL
WEAKNESSES IN THE SYSTEM FOR ACHIEVING THIS GOAL
Although the drafters did not preclude other purposes, it is clear
that the primary goal of the Freedom of Information Act was education
of the public regarding governmental operations.106 Upon signing the
Act into law, President Johnson stated:
This legislation springs from one of our most essential princi-
ples: a democracy works best when the people have all the informa-
tion that the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able
to pull the curtains of secrecy around decisions which can be re-
vealed without injury to the public interest .... I signed this meas-
ure with a deep sense of pride that the United States is an open
society in which the people's right to know is cherished and
guarded.107
Similarly, in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 108 the
Supreme Court noted that the "stress" of the Act is on educating the
public and keeping it informed as to government performance. In
NLRB v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co.,'"9 the Court went even further
by stating that the "FOIA was not intended to function as a private
discovery tool." 110 Although the goal of citizen education has emo-
tional appeal and constitutes a fundamental concept in any public in-
formation system, it is clear that the drafters also sought to effectuate
other open government values. Of these, enhancing public confidence
in government and limiting official discretion appear to be the most
important.
106. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 813, supra note 6, at 2-3, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 37-38.
107. Statement of President Lyndon B. Johnson, Sourcebook I, at 1.
108. 415 U.S. 1, 22 (1974).
109. 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
110. Id. at 242 (emphasis in original); c Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415
U.S. 1, 24 (1974) ("Discovery for litigation purposes is not an expressly indicated purpose of the
[Freedom of Information] Act"). The legislative history of the FOIA neither expressly includes
nor disclaims discovery as a purpose of the statute. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 6, at 3, 7, reprinted
in Sourcebook I, at 38, 42.
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There is a natural distrust of covert government. 1 Regardless of
the justifications for a particular governmental decision, there appears
to be an instinctive suspicion of secretive decisionmaking. The size and
complexity of the bureaucracy provide anonymity, and the resulting
distrust leads to increased demands for devices that will assure proper
decisionmaking. Openness, therefore, becomes one device for fostering
confidence. The drafters of the FOIA clearly intended that disclosure
should serve to improve the appearance of government decisionmak-
ing.1
1 2
In addition to improving appearance, openness has been strongly
advocated as a device for assuring fair informal procedure. 1 3 Open
decisionmaking becomes a particularly attractive means of providing
fair informal procedure where no formal procedures are contemplated
or appropriate. Such actions are found throughout the bureaucracy:
decisions not to act; decisions to investigate or to examine persons,
groups or subject matter; and issuance of informative or educational
material. Rarely do these decisions lend themselves to a formal deci-
sionmaking process or to judicial review, but it is believed that discre-
tion exercised under the scrutiny of public disclosure is more likely to
be fair. In many cases, openness may provide the only practical check
on agency discretion.
However, an abstract commitment to open government must not
be permitted to inhibit careful scrutiny of the present legislation's suc-
cess in achieving this goal. The emotional appeal of open government
must not be allowed to immunize the public information system from
criticism.
A. The Informed Public Goal of the Freedom of Information Act.
1. A System for Educating the Public. The FOIA compels re-
lease of all non-exempt information in specified government files to
"any person," and a requesting party need not show good cause or
need."1 4 Thus, the Act attempts to educate the public by indiscrimi-
nately disclosing disorganized and uncondensed masses of information.
The information varies greatly in quality and relevance; much of it is of
no value whatsoever in understanding or judging the government. If
111. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (a basic purpose is "to
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny"); accord, Committee on Masonic Homes v.
NLRB, 556 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1977).
112. The Senate Report concludes: "A government by secrecy.. . breeds mistrust, dampens
the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty." S. REP. No. 813, supra note 6, at 10, reprinted
in Sourcebook I, at 45.
113. K. DAvIs, DISCRETIONARY JusTIcE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 98 (1969).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
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the request is not carefully drawn, the mass of material disclosed may
be largely superfluous, concealing a small amount of useful informa-
tion and making that information as inaccessible as if it had not been
disclosed. 115
The present system does not consider the quality of the informa-
tion released because it is based on the assumption that the more infor-
mation released, the more citizens will know about their government.
However, the quality of information is directly related to the ability of
the system to educate citizens about the operation of government. The
present system does not release the information in a useable form.
Only a very small percentage of the information contained in govern-
ment files actually discloses the functioning of government. The public
will not digest these huge masses of information in order to obtain in-
formation relating to government performance. The focus of the Act is
on documents rather than actual communication. Hence, the present
public information system weighs total bulk-gross tonnage of govern-
ment paper released-rather than effectiveness of communication.
The FOIA has failed to educate the public as to governmental per-
formance because it does not distinguish between quality and quantity.
At present, quantity is the greatest obstacle to real citizen education.
The recent release of information relating to the Kennedy assassina-
tion, for example, overwhelmed even the media. The first half of the
file contained 80,000 pages. Newsweek, which had a pecuniary interest
in examining the file, admitted that it read only 600 pages.1 6 If News-
week read only 600 of 80,000 pages, it seems safe to assume that few
members of the public will read the full 160,000 pages of the Kennedy
file. It is even more unlikely that the public will read a similar file
about natural gas pipelines or milk market orders or any of the
thousands of mundane matters which are found in government files.
The only limitation upon this broad disclosure requirement is
found in the Act's exemptions. 11 7 These exemptions remove small cate-
gories of information from the general disclosure requirement and pro-
vide the exclusive means for withholding information. Despite the
wide variety of types of information accumulated by various agencies,
the agencies have no discretion to withhold information. The Act goes
so far as to deny judicial discretion to permit the withholding of infor-
115. As the antitrust bar knows, one way to defeat actual discovery of useful information is to
supply unrestricted quantities of business documents. The Delaying Game, Use of Stalling Tactics
by Corporate Lawyers Appears to Be Growing, Wall St. J., May 26, 1976, at 1, col. 6. The FOIA
does this in hopes of making information realistically available.
116. Opening the JFK File, NEwswEEK, Dec. 12, 1977, at 34-35.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
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mation not covered by an exemption, even where nondisclosure is
clearly in the public interest.1"'
Thus, FOIA litigation has centered around the scope of the ex-
emptions and has only rarely involved the usefulness of the disclosure
or the public interest to be served by the disclosure. 19 Congress did
not intend to allow consideration of the quality of access or the realities
of access by either the agencies or the courts. Consistent with that in-
tention, the courts have taken a very inflexible approach to the disclo-
sure problem. Even the abstract policy indicated by the exemptions
has not been regarded as controlling. The exemptions have been read
literally and without any adjustment for individual circumstances or
the public interest, or in furtherance of the goal of citizen education.
Despite the glaring need for practical experimentation and analysis, the
drafters' structure has prevented pragmatic adjustment and has stifled
any useful developments in the public information system. Instead, al-
most all of the judicial thinking and scholarly comment involves se-
mantic analysis of the exemptions.
2. General Citizen Education-A Rational Goal? Practical con-
siderations suggest that educating the citizenry about the functions of
government is a very idealistic and probably unattainable goal. Sub-
stantial political science research discloses the depth of citizen apathy
toward the government. 120 Less than half of the citizens vote in non-
presidential elections.' Most citizens cannot identify the major agen-
cies. l22 Congress unrealistically assumed that citizens would read the
files of agencies they cannot even name."2 Most citizens probably
judge the performance of the government by results, or more likely, by
118. K. DAVIS, SEVENTIES 58.
119. An exception is the balancing against privacy interests under exemption six. Wine
Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-
77 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In addition, there may be some weighing of divergent public interests under
the law enforcement exemption of 7(A). Compare Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), with Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d
724 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
120. For a general discussion of citizen apathy and its impact on political institutions, see E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960); A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, D.
STOKES & W. MILLER, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 209-10 (1966); A. CAMPBELL, P.
CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1964); Jones, The Role ofthe Cam-
paign in CongressionalPolitics, in THE ELECTORAL PROCESS (M. Jennings & L. Zeigler eds. 1966).
121. R. RIPLEY, CONGRESS: PROGRESS AND POLICY 170 (1975).
122. One study found that only 19% of the citizens could name the three branches of govern-
ment. R. LANE & D. SEARS, PUBLIC OPINION 61 (1964).
123. See Belair, Less Government Secrecy and More Personal Privacy? Experience with the
Freedom ofInformation andPrivacy Acts, 4 Crv. LiB. REV. 10, 18 (1977) (tentative evidence sug-
gests that people are not even interested in government ifies about them, except those in intelli-
gence and criminal justice agencies).
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conditions such as employment or inflation, which may or may not be
the result of government action.' 24
Congress must have been aware of the lack of public interest in the
mundane functions of the federal bureaucracy, but it voted overwhelm-
ingly in favor of the FOIA.'25 It was simply politically impossible not
to do so; the notion of mass disclosure of government information is
too politically compelling. Neither Congress nor the public was aware
of the cost of useless disclosure. If this cost had been known, the Act
would not have been so politically attractive. The public might have
chosen to spend federal funds on such things as unemployment bene-
fits, consumer protection or criminal law enforcement. Ironically, pub-
lic apathy and lack of sophistication, along with conscious
misrepresentation, protect the present inefficient information system
from criticism. If the public were aware of the waste of funds for a
system it does not or cannot use, it would likely protest.
B. Integration of Traditional Information Disseminators into the
System.
The test of a sound public information system is not the number of
government documents released, but the amount of useful information
that actually reaches the general population and the relative cost of that
system, both in dollars and in governmental efficiency. The present
system does not fare very well under this test. To actually inform the
public the system must deliver the information in digestable form and
manageable quantity. Therefore, the system must provide for digestion
and dissemination of information contained in government files, either
by existing agencies or by an agency established for that particular pur-
pose. The only way the system can accomplish its public information
function without disrupting the government is by identifying certain
important classes of decisions and making key information regarding
those decisions public.
An attractive alternative would be to give special access to the in-
stitutions that have traditionally been the disseminators of information
to the public. Although there are possible problems with such a solu-
tion, an examination of the present system will be helpful in designing
better mechanisms for integrating these institutions into a new informa-
tion-disclosure system. The major agents are: the media; scholars and
other researchers; interest group representatives; proprietary informa-
124. In reality, the general population aggressively avoids even that information about the
government that is readily available. R. LANE & D. SEARs, PUBLIC OPINION 65-66 (1964).
125. The Act and the amendment passed with virtually no opposition. See 111 CONG. RFC.
26820-21 (1965).
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tion companies; and the government itself as a public information
agent.
1. The Press and Other Media. The most obvious potential ve-
hicle for disseminating public information is the media, and the legisla-
tive history for the original Act and the 1975 amendments indicate a
desire to place government documents in the hands of the media.
126
The media have been the most ardent supporters of the Freedom of
Information Act, and the design of the system tacitly incorporates the
working media as agents for converting government material into use-
ful information for the general public. 127 The language of the Act does
not, however, provide special treatment for any group such as the me-
dia.128 The drafters of the 1974 amendments were puzzled by the in-
ability of the media to use the present access system. 129 This confusion
was the result of the drafters' inability to recognize the flaws in the
design of the system itself. The media cannot consistently benefit from
the public information system in its present form. 30 The major priori-
ties of the news media are marketable information and speed.1 3 1 The
present information system, even with the 1974 deadlines,1 32 cannot
serve either of these goals. The information cannot be compiled and
released quickly enough to be useful. Newsmen continue to accumu-
late information through contacts and interviews with knowledgeable
people.1 33 They rarely have the time to sort through massive govern-
ment files for a news story. Human sources can provide them with both
126. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 2-3, reprinted in Sourcebook 1, at 23-24.
127. 118 CONG. REc. 9950 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Morehead).
128. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 730 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 437 U.S. 214 (1978): "[T]o hold that certain groups-members of the news media, for
example-are the real beneficiaries of FOIA is to create a pecking order unjustified by the lan-
guage of the statute."
129. H. REP. No. 1419, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1972), reprinted in Sourcebook II, at 38. "I am
surprised, however, that the reporters, editors and broadcasters... have made so little use of the
Freedom of Information Act." 118 CONG. REc. 9949, 9950 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Morehead),
based on data at Sourcebook II, at 38 n. 112. See Kohlmeier, The Freedom ofInforrnation Act and
the Agencies: The Journalist'r Viewpoint, 23 AD. L. REv. 143 (1971).
130. The media have found the Act "burdensome and costly." Sigma Delta Chi, The Society
of Professional Journalists, Freedom of Information/1977, Report of the Advancement of Free-
dom of Information Committee 9. Cf. Belair, Less Government Secrecy and More Personal Pri-
vacy? Experience with the Freedom oflnformation andPri acy cts, 4 Civ. LiB. REv. 10, 15 (1977)
(Privacy Act is making it even harder for press to use public information systems).
131. See Hearings on S. 1142 supra note 3, at 20 (statement of Courtney Sheldon, Joint Media
Committee) (in the context of discussing the Act's virtues even when infrequently used, Mr. Shel-
don noted "we [the media] do not use it, because of time factors, money factors, bureaucratic
factors of our own").
132. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6) (1976).
133. Interview with Ed Pound, Washington Star investigative reporter (Oct. 25, 1977).
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information andperspective quickly enough to meet the demands of the
industry.
The media have a basic cost/benefit problem in using FOIA de-
vices. Even where a story might exist, the newsmen cannot afford the
time commitment required by the FOIA. Moreover, there are competi-
tive reasons for not devoting resources to use of the FOIA. If a mem-
ber of the media compels disclosure, the information becomes public
and is available to "any person." The value of exclusivity is lost. The
"free rider" problem makes information obtained under the Act eco-
nomically unattractive.
Most government files are of interest only to government employ-
ees specifically required to deal with them. Clearly, a media organiza-
tion could not justify monitoring or scanning government records in an
effort to uncover the rare interesting document. FOIA disclosure is
helpful only in documenting long range investigative reporting. It is
likely that agency press releases are much more useful to the media
than access under the Act. The media should be recognized as a neces-
sary component of any successful public information system, but they
must be fully integrated into such a system. If a public information
system is to serve the media, it must provide access to government in-
formation very quickly and in a far more concise form than is possible
under the FOIA. Designing such a system will require a better under-
standing of the industry.
The media could serve the public information system more effec-
tively if agency cooperation were improved. Agencies should be com-
pelled to develop more detailed, unbiased and accurate releases. The
media could also be integrated into the public information system by
granting them special status. The media have traditionally been given
special access to many sources of information. 134 For example, the me-
dia question politicians at press conferences. The reason for this spe-
cial access is expedience. All interested citizens cannot be
accommodated at the source of information. To a certain extent, gov-
ernment documents may constitute another source of raw information
to which direct access for all is not feasible. This may be another area
in which the media could perform an intermediary function. The result
would be improved communication and elimination of one costly mode
of access by private citizens.
On the other hand, the granting of special rights to the media
raises numerous questions. First, the public will instinctively oppose
granting special access to one group, even if that group is the press.
134. E.g., Halperin v. Department of State, 565 F.2d 699, 706 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Second, there is a problem of definition. Does the term "media" in-
clude trade association publications or consumer newsletters? Defining
the media to include a trade association would create the same
problems found under the present Act; defining media to exclude some
publications may create first amendment problems. If agencies are re-
quired to make such a distinction, they may commit abuses even more
serious than those occurring under the present Act. A third problem
arises because the media cannot be bound to any agreement limiting
the right to disclose information. 135 Although a system granting the
media special access as a public trustee should be considered, it is rec-
ognized that such an approach may be politically and practically im-
possible to implement. 136
2. Scholars and Other Researchers. Like the media, scholars are
not effectively utilized by the public information system to further the
citizen education goal. Researchers have both special needs and spe-
cial services to offer the system. A successful system must recognize
and incorporate these attributes.
Independent researchers require free access to information; they
cannot tolerate gaps in their research that may result from the nine
exemptions. On the other hand, they have more time than most re-
questing parties, and need not put time pressures on the agencies. They
are a recognizable and easily confined group, and their research often
serves the public by developing comprehensible information about the
government.
As requesting parties, scholars need not rely on the broad "any
person" access. They serve the public indirectly and should therefore
be able to satisfy any "good cause" requirement.1 37 Scholars can be
allowed the same access to information that is given to agency employ-
ees. Complete access could be exchanged for promises to protect the
integrity of the agency files.138 Many agencies, including the Federal
Trade Commission, have maintained a special status for scholars. The
agency can determine the legitimacy of the research effort and allow
135. A possible model for restricting the use of information obtained by the media is the
recently enacted Ethics in Government Act of 1978, P.L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824. That statute
requires certain high level government employees to file financial statements which are then made
publicly available. Nevertheless, it is a violation of the Act for any person to use that information
for commercial purposes. Id. § 205(c).
136. This solution is more attractive to Mr. Koch than to Mr. Rubin.
137. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674-76 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
138. Such promises would not serve the ends of the media since they would presumably be
incompatible with the duty to inform the public rather than to decide what information the citizen
should receive.
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free access to this small group of people. Researchers can do their own
searches and follow their own leads-false or fruitful-thereby reliev-
ing the agency staff of a substantial burden.
Properly utilized, researchers could substantially aid the process of
public education. They have the time and motivation necessary to con-
duct careful research and to synthesize the information in a useable
form. On the other hand, they cannot tolerate important gaps in their
research and should be allowed access to information that is properly
withheld from the general public. For example, researchers could be
allowed access to the opinion portions of internal memoranda for use
in their research without creating government in a "fish bowl."
The value of the services researchers could perform in a public
information system is demonstrated by the Getman, Goldberg and
Herman study,13 9 which was made possible by the landmark case of
Getman v. NLRB.'4 ° These scholars wished to conduct a study of labor
union organization elections. For this purpose, they sought the names
and addresses of employees, but the Board denied access in order to
protect the employees' privacy. The court found that under the
"clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy" test, exemption six did not
protect the material. Unlike other parts of the Act, the court held that
this exemption compelled a balancing of interests. An invasion of pri-
vacy was permitted by the Act if it was warranted; indeed, if it was not
"clearly unwarranted." The admitted invasion of privacy by these re-
searchers was found to be warranted in the interests of scholarship.
The information was used to support some rather extraordinary find-
ings and conclusions that contradicted some of labor's most cherished
assumptions. 141 The court recognized that scholars perform a service to
the general public and hence struck the privacy balance in their
favor.142 The ironic result of the Getman case is that it contributed to a
study that has been quite useful to the NLRB. The NLRB might have
served itself and the public better by providing special "resident
scholar" status to these individuals in order to facilitate their study.
The NLRB was not so much concerned that the addresses sought
would be available to one or two recognized scholars, but that release
to one person under the Act necessarily would require release to "any
139. See note 141 infra.
140. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
141. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW
AND REALITY (1976). This study has prompted the Board to consider changes in basic policies.
See Roomikin & Abrams, Using.Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation .4 Proposal, 90 HARv.
L. REV. 1441 (1977).
142. Cf Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 1974) (disclosure of names
of potential customers for commercial business does not overcome privacy interests).
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person." Under the present system, after the balance has been struck in
favor of release to a particular requester, access may not be denied to
any other requester, even if the balance would have been struck in the
opposite direction had that person filed the initial request. Granting
special status to certain requesters, although not contemplated under
the present Act, would be one solution to this dilemma.
An improved information system would provide special access to
legitimate independent researchers while limiting the general access of
the public. Certainly the system would be more rational if it treated the
two access problems separately. This approach would not only de-
crease government costs-both in money and operational efficiency-
but it would result in a substantial increase in the amount of useful and
meaningful information actually reaching the public.
The major problem with this approach would be in adequately
and fairly defining the size of this special access group. Only independ-
ent researchers should be included-those representing parties engaged
in dealings with the government would not be granted special status.
Degree candidates and recognized scholars, except those who serve as
consultants to private interests, should be included. Unlike the media,
scholars may be willing to obtain access to certain data conditioned on
their agreement not to disclose any specific information obtained from
the agency.
3. Special Interest Groups. Information gathering and dissemi-
nation is one of the most important functions of an interest group's
representative. Information is often the primary source of a representa-
tive's ability to influence legislation or regulation; interpretation of in-
formation is an important means of serving and controlling
representatives' constituents.14 3 Thus, access to government informa-
tion is important for representatives of noneconomic special interest
groups as well as for representatives of large economic interests. Con-
gress recognized that the FOIA could serve the public by enhancing the
impact of interest group representatives. Clearly, Congress meant to
provide a tool for public interest representatives,'" but it must have
also recognized that this tool would be used by economic interest
groups.
Despite the aversion to lobbyists, students of government agree
that they serve an essential function in the operation of government.
Representatives of special interests have incentives to communicate
143. L. DEXTER, How ORGANIZATIONS ARE REPRESENTED IN WASHINGTON 104, 113, 130
(1969).
144. Nader representatives dominated the legislative activity relating to 1974 amendments.
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constituent sentiments to legislators and regulators; by serving their
special interest, they help decisionmakers maintain contact with the
governed. They also have incentives to digest and distribute informa-
tion regarding certain government operations. Thus, with a few
changes, special interest representatives could be utilized to enhance
the education potential of a public information system.
However, no matter how evenly the system distributes public in-
formation, ninety percent of the citizens are left out of the power struc-
ture. 145 Consequently, the value of the services performed by group
representatives in the system must be weighed against the danger of
affording them additional leverage to resist government efforts to pro-
tect the general public. Recent legislation that exposes administrative
decisionmaking may serve to increase the power of special interests to
the detriment of the public interest.
Although interest group representatives could be used to deliver
information to segments of the public, they should remain end-use con-
sumers. On balance, incorporating special interest representatives as
agents to digest and disperse information does not seem justified and
would not serve the same goals as incorporation of the media. Special
interest representatives do not disperse information widely enough to
benefit the general public. Indeed, the major criticism of the present
system is that such representatives do, in fact, have far greater access to
government information than the general public.
4. Proprietary Information Gatherers. Some entrepreneurs have
recognized the existence of a market for digested government informa-
tion and have established businesses to carry out this function in spe-
cialized areas. The most obvious of these are the companies that use
government sources to develop sophisticated mailing lists. Other com-
panies maintain and distribute information released by certain agen-
cies. 146
These organizations are not yet significant enough to allow evalua-
tion of their proper role in a public information system. Clearly, they
could be used to make government information available to customers.
Nonetheless, no special access should be provided for these organiza-
tions. They should be confined to the more limited "any person" access
provided for the general public and further confined to certain classes
of documents.
145. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE (1960).
146. Montgomery, Peters & Weinberg, The Freedom ofInformation Act: Strategic Opportuni-
ties and Threats, 19 SLOAN MANAGEMENT REV. 1 (1978); see, e.g., Information Acquisition Corp.
v. Department of Justice, 444 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1978).
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5. Government as a Public Information Medium. The institution
with the greatest potential for making the public information system
work is the government itself. At present, the agencies are passive par-
ticipants in the system; they accumulate information and distribute it.
They have no duty under the FOIA to create documents and cannot be
forced to make information available in a useful form. The agencies
are merely conduits through which information flows.
Indeed, the greatest practical weakness of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act is its failure to trust the bureaucracy to transform amor-
phous public records into material that would be useful to the public. 4 7
The bureaucracy has special access and knowledge that would enable it
to accomplish this task. However, there is a general lack of confidence
in the bureaucracy's propensity for furthering public information goals.
This is the result of misplaced blame for the failure of the system.
When judging the performance of government officials in the present
system, all of the reasons for a poor system must be noted; for along
with innate bureaucratic diffidence and secrecy, there are many public
interest explanations for the failure of government officials to respond
to the Act with satisfactory fervor. A system can be devised that would
impose an affirmative duty on the agencies to insure that the public is
informed about official activities. Realistically, citizen education must
depend to a large extent on the agencies themselves to edit and dis-
tribute public information. Congress should not focus on releasing ex-
isting documents but should compel agencies to provide useable
information. For example, Congress could earmark funds in each
agency's budget to be used exclusively for purposes of making informa-
tion available to the public in a useable form. Thus, in order to tap
these funds, the agencies themselves would have to devise a means for
informing the public. The device chosen would be suited to each
agency's unique circumstances. Legislative budget and oversight re-
view would ensure development of a viable approach to citizen educa-
tion.
Agencies could adopt several alternatives for carrying out such a
mandate. More complete press releases and other general distributions
hold substantial potential for informing the public and making infor-
mation available in a form that can be used by the media. If releases
are to replace partially indiscriminate access, Congress must compel
disclosure of such things as internal decisions and background mate-
147. "Moreover, by enacting the Freedom of Information Act, Congress rejected the conten-
tion that voluntary agency disclosure is sufficient to guarantee 'the right of persons to know about
the business of their government .... .' Rocap v. Indiek, 539 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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rial. 148 Agencies should also be required to maintain public informa-
tion libraries that would make certain government files readily
available to the public. The present system offers access to most gov-
ernment documents only after a request and file search. Such a process
is slow and quite costly, especially in relation to the usefulness of the
information released.1 49 Establishment of libraries would force the
agencies to organize and screen the documents prior to any request.
Thus, the documents would be available almost immediately, and at a
much lower cost to both the requester and the government. 150 In addi-
tion, individuals could search the available files themselves if unsure of
the information required.1 51 This process would necessarily give the
agency control over the information available, but policing procedures
could ensure the accessibility of information necessary for purposes of
evaluating agency performance.
Similarly, agencies should make better, although not necessarily
more, use of publications. Recently, congressional committees have
published much of the information submitted to them in their investi-
gations. Agencies, too, could compile and publish significant material
relevant to the most important decisions. Again, the agency would
have to be trusted to edit and organize the material because, in any
agency action, only a small amount of the material is significant. The
agency staff would be most qualified to compile such material.
Federal Register publication presents another problem that clearly
calls for considerable reform. 152 The direction for reform, as in the rest
of the public information system, should be toward decreasing the
148. See S. 2490, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (a bill to reform administrative procedure includ-
ing an increase in agencies' duty to inform the public).
149. The six most common complaints discussed by the administrative conference study relate
to this mechanism. Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom ofInformation Act:
A Proposalfor Uniform Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217, 221-25 (1971).
150. If the information is already in libraries, then search fees will be inappropriate. Note,
The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 895, 903 (1974).
Cf. SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976) (library reference materials stored
in National Library of Medicine's computer data bank were not "records" required to be made
available at nominal charge under FOIA). Nonetheless, under current judicial decisions, it is
highly unlikely that an agency will be able to use fees to recapture any but a small portion of the
cost.
151. Provision should also be made for cost recapture where the government information sys-
tem accrues to the benefit of a private interest that should bear the expense rather than the general
public. E.g., SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1976). The fees should be
returned to the budget of the agency concerned, not the United States Treasury, as is required
under the User Fee Statute, 31 U.S.C. § 483(a) (1976).
152. It is presently very difficult to determine what must be published. K. DAVIS, SEVEnTES
72-75; accord, Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 462-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (instruction held void for
failure to publish because policy pronouncements clearly must be published where they have "sig-
nificant impact"); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 658-61 (D.N.M. 1976).
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amount of information disclosed while increasing the usefulness of that
information.153 Publication in the Federal Register in a meaningful
form will enhance the public educational impact of the information
system. To this end, careful study of a modification of section (a)(1) of
the present Act should be made. A modest language change would
clear up some ambiguity and limit the publication requirement.154 A
major legislative investigation is recommended, however, as a founda-
tion for a total reworking of the requirements for publication in the
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulation.
Not only should agencies be assigned an active role in informing
the public about their own operations, but they should also be required
to do more to further the other open government goals. Mere disclo-
sure of documents may, to some extent, serve the appearance of public
decisionmaking, but even this appearance is illusory if the weight of
disclosure actually hides most decisionmaking. The Sunshine Act, for
example, has been a failure because only special interests have the time
or inclination to attend the myriad of agency meetings.155 While broad
disclosure has helped somewhat to create an appearance of open gov-
ernment, it does not enlighten the public as to the reasons for various
government decisions.
This goal could be achieved by requiring agencies to provide the
rationale for their decisions whenever feasible. Disclosure of docu-
ments showing the basis for a decision will rarely interfere with the
decisionmaking process. Only by requiring the government itself to fo-
cus on the reasons for its informal action will real openness result. The
FOIA cannot be used to compel agencies to provide reasoned opin-
ions.1 56 Therefore, realistically open decisionmaking will be promoted
by legislation that provides for greater disclosure of the reasons for in-
formal action and for other efficient processes such as notice and writ-
153. The publication requirement suffers from the same defect as the rest of the Act: there is
so much indiscriminately disclosed information that there is, in essence, no notice. Johnson, .4
New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869, 880-81 (1971). In 1977, the Federal Regis-
ter contained 65,603 pages. In 1978, the total was 61,261 pages.
154. See the proposal set out in the Appendix.
155. Similarly, Congress opened up such traditionally closed proceedings as committee
"markup" sessions. The Senate: Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 2 U.S.C. § 190a-l(b)
(1970) (repealed, S. Res. 9, § 2, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 19337 (1975)); The House:
H.R. Res. 259 (93d Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 6422 (1973)). "Markup" is the meeting among
committee members in which they revise the bill in light of the hearings before reporting to the
full chamber. This program has also had predictably negative results in terms of better govern-
ment. F. CUMMINGS, CAPITOL HILL MANUAL 46-47 (1976).
156. Grumman Aircraft v. Renegotiation Bd., 421 U.S. 168 (1975); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
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ten comment.157 The agencies must be placed under an affirmative
duty to explain their actions rather than merely providing interested
persons with masses of documents.
All of these proposals incorporate the bureaucracy into the process
of transforming the information from an amorphous mass into concise,
meaningful parcels. Although the propensity of bureaucrats to ignore
specific congressional mandates is vastly overstated, policing of their
performance in the system is essential. This policing can be effective.
The work of the Justice Department's Freedom of Information Com-
mittee was very effective in monitoring agency information policy,15 8
and the Justice Department, through its role as attorney for the govern-
ment, continues to take an aggressive role in increasing public access to
information. 15 9 Administrative enforcement of a public information
policy is more effective and efficient than judicial enforcement and
should be more widely used.
Ironically, the most concise information regarding governmental
performance is contained in the policymaking portion of internal gov-
ernment documents, and this information is protected from disclosure
by exemption five. Immunity under this exemption is one of the few
established notions under the Freedom of Information Act.160 How-
157. Open reasoning also improves government decisionmaking. See generally K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). Nonetheless, adding procedures to
informal decisionmaking is dangerous business, requiring subtle analysis, for procedures can de-
stroy the efficiency of the process and in the area of informal action, efficiency is usually the
equivalent of fairness. See generally Verkuil, supra note 96. This danger can be overcome by
tailoring each process to the individual informal decisionmaking and not by any generalized re-
quirement.
158. H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 129, at 68, reprintedin Sourcebook II, at 75.
159. Letter from Attorney General Bell advising the agencies that the Department of Justice
will not defend agency decisions in cases where it is not in the public interest to do so. 3 ACCESS
REP. 1-2 (May 17, 1977).
160. Inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda may be withheld subject to two limitations:
factual, non-privileged material generally must be released, and policy material that constitutes
secret agency law must be released. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). Factual
material may be protected only if inextricably intertwined with policymaking material. EPA v.
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 90-92 (1973). There are two reasons for the fact/opinion distinction: first, the
drafters wished to protect the free flow of ideas; second, the last phrase of the exemption is said to
incorporate the discovery laws, and government information is privileged only to the extent that it
relates to policymaking. Professor Davis finds that Congress emphasized the former, the protec-
tion of free flow of ideas, and not the more conceptual rationale based on the official document
privilege. K. DAVIS, SEVENTIES 92-93.
Agency witnesses argued that a full and frank exchange of opinions would be impossible
if all internal communications were made public. They contended, and with merit, that
advice from staff assistants and the exchange of ideas among agency personnel would
not be completely frank if they were forced to "operate in a fishbowl."
H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 10, reprintedin Sourcebook I, at 31. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit agreed: "In the Federal Establishment, as in General Motors or any other hierarchical
giant, there are enough incentives as it is for playing it safe, and listing with the wind; Congress
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ever, the need for protection of all internal memoranda is overstated.
The free flow of ideas rationale loses its vitality as time passes after a
final determination is made on the matter for which the document was
drafted. Furthermore, if agency staffs were aware that their work prod-
uct would become a matter of public record at some future time, the
quality of their work might improve. 6' Staff members will continue to
give agency officials their opinions because it is their job to do so. The
decisionmaking process as a whole may benefit from criticism of the
internal work product or the decisional process that resulted in an offi-
cial decision.
The electorate would be better informed as to the rationale for a
particular decision if important internal documents were subject to dis-
closure at some future date. Agencies would find such a requirement
feasible as compared to the present system, which consumes substantial
editing resources under the fact/opinion distinction. The limitation
placed on the fifth exemption should be founded on the relevancy of
the document to government policymaking.
The Federal Trade Commission has adopted a policy favoring re-
lease of all parts of internal memoranda. Even the policy portions of
the memoranda are released three years after the file in which they are
contained has been closed.'62 None of the paralysis that was predicted
under such an approach has resulted. Indeed, decisionmaking at the
FTC appears to be totally unaffected. Three years may be too long a
period, but there may be good reasons for delaying the disclosure for
some period of time after the decision. As a compromise, release of
internal memoranda is recommended one year after the decision to
which they relate became final. Of course, agencies would be free to
adopt a shorter time period.
Agencies have raised substantial opposition to the universal re-
lease of internal opinions, and Congress and most commentators have
agreed with the arguments opposing such release. Arguments in favor
of release revolve around the fact that opinion portions of government
memoranda are the best source of information regarding agency per-
formance.
clearly did not propose to add to them the threat of cross-examination in a public tribunal."
Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C Cir. 1969).
161. Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660-61 (6th Cir. 1972). The Govern-
ment in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976), requires that agency meetings be conducted in
public with certain exceptions. When an agency employee prepares a memorandum, he cannot be
certain that his recommendation will not be disclosed in connection with an open meeting. The
traditional "government privilege" is thereby substantially lessened.
162. To a large extent this policy was the result of a practical judgment that segregation of fact
from policy was not worth the resources after the passage of a number of years.
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In light of the opposition to release of all internal memoranda, a
more limited alternative is offered. Release of internal documents, in-
cluding opinion portions, would be compelled only when a document
relates to a decision defined under categories similar to subsections
(a)(2)(A) or (B). The one year hiatus for such release would be re-
tained if Congress finds, after careful study, that sound internal deci-
sionmaking demands a time lapse between the use of the internal
memorandum and its disclosure to the public. This limited approach
would still disclose the information necessary to evaluate the agency's
decisionmaking process but would not require the burdensome disclo-
sure of internal documents that are merely the transmission of paper
unrelated to any constructive process of the bureaucracy.
On the other hand, since the fact/policy segregation appears to be
an unfruitful waste of agency resources, if this limited alternative is
adopted, it should be in lieu of a fact/policy distinction and not in ad-
dition to that distinction. Internal memoranda disclosed under the
public information system should be available in their entirety.
Release of internal memoranda merely opens up government in-
formation already formulated. The real solution lies in agencies actu-
ally working to educate citizens regarding the agencies' individual
performances. The disclosure of internal documents is merely a safe-
guard against the withholding of information important to evaluation
of agency performance.
6. Conclusion and Preliminary Suggestion/or Improving the Per-
formance of the System Through Informational Media. Access to raw
government documents does not actually enable the public to evaluate
governmental performance. For a citizen education system to be suc-
cessful, it must compress the raw material into concise, manageable
units. At present, the government is a passive instrument in making the
information realistically available to the public. Agencies should be
required to do much of the work necessary to make information avail-
able to the general public in a useful form. Such a process would re-
quire the public to place its trust in the agencies. However, this trust
can be supported by special appropriations with attendant congres-
sional subcommittee oversight and by more administrative enforce-
ment.
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V. PUBLIC INTEREST FAILURE: FAILURE TO CONSIDER THE RIGHTS
OF THOSE WHO DEAL WITH THE GOVERNMENT
When Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act in
1967163 by enacting the Freedom of Information Act, one of its princi-
pal aims was the elimination of broad agency discretion to withhold
documents and to determine who should have access to them. 164 The
FOIA provides that, subject to nine specific exemptions, each agency
shall make available to any person, on request, all agency records.
165
Numerous records submitted to the government, either voluntarily or
under compulsion, now fall within the purview of the FOIA. It cannot
be in the public interest to subject all of these records to disclosure
without regard to their relevance to a particular decision or their role in
the decision-making process. Nevertheless, this is the effect of the Act.
Despite the fact that personal or proprietary information submit-
ted to the government is subject to disclosure under the FOIA, individ-
uals and business entities continue to risk public disclosure by
submitting information. Only a discrete class of this information
should be subject to the disclosure requirements of the Act; the remain-
der should be exempted from disclosure. There is insufficient public
interest in these essentially private records to require public disclosure
merely because they are contained in the files of a federal agency.
166
Such a limitation is necessary to correct the excesses of the free-wheel-
ing access approach that encompasses all records submitted to an
agency. It is only when a decision itself must be disclosed through the
public information system that the underlying records should be sub-
ject to disclosure.
Fundamentally, a balance must be struck, not only between the
163. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). The FOIA was subse-
quently amended in 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-502), but the changes effected by that amendment (prin-
cipally in establishing time limits for agency action and in narrowing the scope of exemption
seven) are not within the scope of this Article.
164. The Public Information section of the Administrative Procedure Act provided in perti-
nent part: "(c) Public records-Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of official record
shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons properly and directly con-
cerned except information held confidential for good cause found." Administrative Procedure Act
of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237. As Congress later recognized, "Under the present
section 3, any Government official can under color of law withhold almost anything from any
citizen under the vague standards-or, more precisely, lack of standards-in section 3." S. REP.
No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 95.
165. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b) (1976).
166. One of the authors has previously urged the recognition of a "citizen-government privi-
lege." Koch, The Freedom ofInformation Act: Suggestionsfor Making InformationAvailable to the
Public, 32 MD'. L. Rv. 189, 217-19 (1972); accord, Miller & Cox, supra note 46, at 229. Such a
privilege, like many other discovery privileges, would require balancing of competing interests.
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public interest and the government's interest, as in exemption five, 167
for example, but also between the public's interest and the privacy in-
terest of the person submitting the information. Thus, three factors
must be considered: the effect of disclosure on the government, the
perceived public benefit of disclosure and the possible harm to the sub-
mitter of the information.
A. The Absence of Sufficient Protectionfor Private Information.
In order to determine what personal or commercial information
submitted to the government should be subject to disclosure, it is first
necessary to recognize the various types of information submitted, the
reasons for the submissions and the purposes for which the information
is to be used. Individuals who submit information to the government
do not always do so voluntarily. Even when production of information
cannot be compelled, in many cases the submission of that information
is not truly voluntary. For example, many persons are required to sub-
mit personal information to the government in order to obtain social
security or medicaid benefits. The fact that one must either submit the
information or forego the benefit belies the "voluntary" nature of the
submission.
Often, proprietary information must be submitted in order to ob-
tain a government contract 68 or to be selected as a government conces-
sionaire. 169 In addition, personal information is often obtained by the
government from someone other than the person concerned.' 70 For ex-
167. Exemption five, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976), protects government memoranda "which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." This
language has been held to include the traditional privilege available to the government in litiga-
tion, often called "executive privilege," which protects the internal deliberations of the agency as
well as the attorney-client privilege. Federal Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Mer-
rill, 99 S. Ct. 2800, 2809 (1979); see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d
820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), opinion after remand, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct. Cl. 1958)
(Reed, J.). The Merrill case also recognized a qualified privilege for confidential commercial in-
formation, based on civil discovery principles. 99 S. Ct. at 2810-12. Exemption five recognizes
that a balance must be struck between the public's need for information concerning the govern-
ment and the government's need to protect some of its deliberations. Thus, courts have recog-
nized that purely factual information must be released, while deliberative matter may be withheld.
See Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d at 824, 826.
168. E.g., Burroughs Corp. v. Schiesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975); Robertson v.
Department of Defense, 402 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1975).
169. E.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(National Parks I), opinion after remand sub nom., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v.
Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (National Parks II).
170. The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) (1976) requires that such information be collected
from the person concerned, to the extent practicable, when it may result in adverse determination
of an individual's rights, benefits and privileges under federal programs.
[Vol. 1979:1
PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEM
ample, an employer may be required to submit detailed information
concerning his employees.171 Information is also submitted in response
to compulsory process or the threat thereof.'
72
Information submitted is used for a variety of purposes by the nu-
merous government agencies. It is commonly used to determine
whether a violation of law has been committed. In the event that no
violation is found, the investigation may be closed, but the documents
will generally be retained by the government for a certain period of
time. 73 Thus, personal or business information that merely happens to
be in the possession of the government is often the subject of FOIA
requests. Prior to determining the applicability oflan exemption, the
fundamental question arises of whether public access to essentially pri-
vate information is warranted. Such a determination must be based
upon an examination of the purposes served by public access to private
documents in the possession of the government.
Although the basic purpose of the FOIA is to inform the public
with regard to governmental operations, the public's right to informa-
tion is not unlimited. It is generally balanced against the agency's abil-
ity to conduct effective investigations if the documents are disclosed
(e.g., exemption 7(A)174 and portions of exemption four175), the
agency's ability to carry on meaningful internal decisionmaking (e.g.,
exemption five 176) or the government's ability to maintain essential na-
tional security (exemption one177). Thus, regardless of the importance
of an investigation or adjudication to the public, an agency is generally
able to protect most information contained in active law enforcement
files even when no further legal action on the files "is in prospect."'
' 78
171. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976).
172. E.g., income tax returns.
173. The regulations of the National Archives and Records Service, General Services Agency,
allow destruction of records after a period of five years.
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (1976). Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement pur-
poses are exempt to the extent that production would "interfere with enforcement proceedings."
E.g., New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1976); Title Guarantee
Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834 (1976).
175. Exemption four, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976), has been construed to exempt "commercial
or financial" information "if disclosure ... is likely to have either of the following effects: (1) to
impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information was ob-
tained." National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(footnote omitted). Only the first part of the test is directly related to the agency's ability to func-
tion.
176. See note 167 supra and accompanying text.
177. Exemption one protects properly classified national security information. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1) (1976).
178. National Pub. Radio v. Bell, 431 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D.D.C. 1977).
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Similarly, it is generally accepted that government cannot "operate in a
fish bowl," and thus regardless of the importance of expression of indi-
vidual views, exemption five recognizes that the right of public access
to government records is limited by the needs of the government and
by the public interest in enabling the government to function effi-
ciently.1 79
For information submitted to the government by persons or busi-
nesses, Congress has created exemptions four and six, which recognize
that not all such information should be subject to disclosure. Docu-
ments that are essentially private may come into the temporary posses-
sion of the government, ' 0 and Congress has recognized the need for a
balancing test that weighs the legitimate interest of the public against
the interest of the provider of information. Thus, commercial informa-
tion is exempt if it is "privileged or confidential,"' and personal infor-
mation is exempt where disclosure would constitute "a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."' 2
The current procedure for balancing competing interests is inade-
quate for several reasons. First, it is difficult to apply. Since a balance
must be struck for each of the records in the government's possession,
an agency and a court on de novo review 183 often must conduct a full-
scale evidentiary inquiry into the nature and extent of any possible
harm resulting from the disclosure. In addition, the public interest, and
possibly the private interest of the requester, should be considered.' 84
The person submitting the document or information contained in the
record has the paramount interest in nondisclosure but often is not a
party to the agency "proceeding"' 8 5 that determines whether a request
for that document will be granted or denied. Although the submitter
may receive notice of a FOIA request, which is generally a matter of
public record, he will have no effective means of participation in the
decision, due to the ex parte nature of the decisionmaking process. In-
deed, the requirement that initial requests be processed within ten
179. See generally Davis, supra note 48, at 794-97.
180. There is another class of confidential information that consists of information (rather
than private documents) submitted to the government. The distinction is between government
forms (such as census or the 10K forms) containing information extracted by the submitter from
his own records and the wholesale transfer of private documents to the government.
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
182. Id. § 552(b)(6).
183. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
184. Such a hearing was held in Thrifty Drug Stores Co. v. FTC, 1976-2 Trade Cas. V 61,194
(D.D.C. 1976); V. Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (hearing before
an administrative law judge).
185. The proceeding is nonadjudicative, there are no formal parties and there is no opportu-
nity to respond to the arguments of the agency staff against disclosure.
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working days and appeals within twenty working days simply does not
allow an agency to afford a meaningful opportunity for participation in
the decision to grant or withhold records to anyone outside the agency.
It is curious to note that on de novo review courts now routinely
make more searching inquiries-including holding hearings, taking
depositions, and affording the right to cross-examine' 86-than are pos-
sible for any agency. 8 7 Thus, by filing a law suit, a requester, or possi-
bly the submitter seeking to prevent disclosure, will obtain both a fuller
analysis of the issues and quite possibly the first complete presentation
of all of the issues because the district court is not operating under the
same time restraints. After the district court proceeding is completed,
the agency may realize that its initial decision was incorrect. In view of
the massive volume of requests and the strict time deadlines, the agen-
cies cannot possibly comply with the procedural formalities that must
be observed in a court proceeding.
Second, the major deficiency of the present interpretation of ex-
emption four is that, in the abstract, it fails to provide any guidance
whatsoever. Unlike the other exemptions in the FOIA, an agency's de-
cision to withhold records under exemption four cannot be based upon
a mere analysis of the data itself. The courts have required that the
agency determine whether disclosure will cause substantial competitive
injury. Although some agencies may have the expertise necessary to
make this determination, most do not. For any agency, such a determi-
nation can be made only after an analysis of the requested data, the
structure of the relevant business or industry, and the company's com-
petitive position within that industry. Even those agencies that have
some experience in these matters will encounter great difficulties in
making such a determination in the abstract context in which it arises
under the Act. Another major flaw in exemption four is the absence of
any requirement that the real party- in interest-the submitter of the
information-be allowed to participate in the determination.
B. Judicial Attempts to Protect Private Information in Government
Files.
In response to the problem of protecting private information, sev-
eral courts allowed "reverse-FOIA" suits in which information submit-
186. Eg., Thrifty Drug Stores Co. v. FTC, 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,194 (D.D.C. 1976).
187. In one instince, an agency did assigna FOIA appeal to an administiative law judge for a
hearing. The hearing stage lasted 39 days (with two days of actual hearings); review by the agency
consumed an additional 52 days. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FED-
ERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE HEARINGS, 158-59 (1977). See Planning Research Corp. v.
FPC, 555 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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ters challenged the propriety of the disclosure.'8 8 As a result of the
Supreme Court's decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,189 this option is
no longer available. The Court held "that Congress did not limit an
agency's discretion to disclose information when it enacted the FOIA.
It necessarily follows that the Act does not afford [submitters of infor-
mation] any right to enjoin agency disclosure." 190 Chrysler was, how-
ever, permitted to base its challenge of the agency's disclosure on
section 10(e) of the APA 191 and the Trade Secrets Act.' 92
The pressure created by the inequity of the present disclosure sys-
tem compelled lower courts to recognize the reverse-FOIA suit. The
same pressure may be seen as a factor behind the Court's construction
of the Trade Secrets Act. The usefulness of the APA section 10-Trade
Secrets action remains to be seen. But, like the reverse-FOIA suit, the
Trade Secrets solution is a stop-gap measure. It does not attempt to
solve the underlying problem-determining the instances in which the
public right to access should be balanced against the right of privacy
and the factors which should be used in striking that balance.
C. Some Existing Proposed Solutions.
One possible solution that has not been explored by the courts in
depth is the possibility of interpreting the FOIA to exclude from its
coverage most private records submitted to the government. One might
argue that the definition of agency records subject to disclosure under
the Act should be interpreted to exclude ordinary personal and corpo-
rate records submitted to agencies in response to agency subpoenas.' 93
188. See generaly Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-The Jeverse-FOIA Suit,
1976 DUKE L.J. 330. See Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 565 F.2d 721
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers
Union, 434 U.S. 1030, remanded 590 F.2d 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924 (1977); Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
189. 99 S. Ct. 1705 (1979).
190. Id. at 1714.
191. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
193. Under the FOIA, an agency need only make "records" available on request. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1976). Documents such as handwritten notes, Porter County Chapter of the Izaak
Walton League of America, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comi'n, 380 F. Supp. 630 (N.D.
Ind. 1974), and personal papers, Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C.), order stayed sub
nom., Nixon v. Richey, 513 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1975), dismissed as moot, 437 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1977), have been held not to constitute agency records within the meaning of the FOIA.
Most courts faced with FOIA requests for business documents contained in agency files have
regarded the documents as nonexempt, and have ordered disclosure without pausing to consider
whether the documents actually constitute records under the FOIA. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Saxbe, 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,057 (D.D.C. 1974); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339
F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
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Forms or questionnaires specially prepared for a government agency
would constitute agency records subject to disclosure under the Act.
There are several flaws in this interpretation that would confirm the
essentially private nature of records surrendered to the government.
First, it does not attempt to explain the applicability of the disclosure
requirement to some private records contained in government files; in-
stead, it seeks to distinguish between various records on the basis of
property law concepts of possession and bailment, which are inade-
quate to serve the fundamental purpose of the FOIA. In addition, such
an interpretation would require that protected private documents be
returned to the submitter at the close of the relevant investigation in
order to prevent the use of those documents in a later or connected
proceeding. This would have the unfortunate result of preventing pub-
lic access to the records supporting the governmental decision.1 94
Another possible approach would give agencies the authority to
make commitments of confidentiality which would then be recognized
under the FOIA.195 Such promises could be recognized under subsec-
tion (b)(3) as a statutory exemption from disclosure. However, such a
grant of authority to the agencies would not be consistent with the
FOIA goal of limiting agency discretion. Indeed, it would be tanta-
mount to a return to the "double-barreled loophole"' 96 of the 1946 ver-
sion of the FOIA, providing access only "to persons properly and
directly concerned except information held confidential for good cause
found."'197
grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972). But see Levi Strauss & Co. v.
FTC, No. C76-735 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 1976); Green v. Kleindienst, 378 F. Supp. 1397 (D.D.C.
1974). Cf. 44 U.S.C.A. § 3301 (West Supp. 1979) (archival definition of records). It is the position
of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice that such documents are indeed
agency records subject to disclosure under the FOIA. R. Saloschin, T. Newkirk & D. Gavin, A
Short Guide to the Freedom of Information Act 32-33 (Dec. 1977), reprinted in FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION COMM., OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFOR-
MATION CASE LIST app. E (Feb. 1978). Nevertheless, in the recent case of Goland v. CIA, 43 Ad.
L.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Bazelon, J., dissenting), the dissent stated that the court held that
certain documents in the possession of an agency were not agency records, but rather congres-
sional records on loan to the agency and, thus, not subject to the Act.
194. An individual's right to information concerning governmental operations may often be as
important as the right to privacy and the right to confide in the government. H.R. REP. No. 1497,
supra note 52, at 6, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 27.
195. Hearings on S. 1142, supra note 3, at 225 (statement of Elliot Richardson). The disfa-
vored House Report on the 1960 amendments indicated that such commitments would exempt
documents under subsection (b)(4). H. REP. No. 1497, supra note 52, at 10, reprinted in
Sourcebook I, at 31. That appraisal has been rejected by the courts, presumably since it would
allow agencies to create precisely the same exemption that existed under the 1946 law. See Petkas
v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
196. S. REP. No. 1219, supra note 164, at 10, reprinted in Sourcebook I, at 95.
197. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237.
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A final, almost desperate solution would require revision of the
National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton198 standard that
compels the agencies to weigh the possible business harm resulting
from a decision to claim exemption four.19 9 Efforts to simplify the ap-
plication of this standard are not likely to succeed. A test that would
require an agency to make a decision based on information not in its
possession is not feasible. In addition, the test is fundamentally ambig-
uous, requiring a case-by-case, document-by-document determination.
These ad hoc solutions cannot replace a thoughtful examination of the
problem by the only branch of government capable of producing a
comprehensive solution-the legislature.
D. Towards a Solution for Protecting Private Information.
Most of the problems involved in administering the Act could be
solved by narrowing the scope of private documents subject to disclo-
sure. Disclosure would then be automatic and the problems associated
with exemption four would not arise. The government obtains many
different types of documents from various persons and for a variety of
purposes. Only when decisions are based on these documents should
the public have access to the underlying documents. The public's inter-
est is in knowing whether government action taken on the basis of the
documents was justified, consistent with past or future actions and in
the public interest.
The first step in determining whether the underlying documents
need be disclosed is an examination of the agency decision based on
the documents. If that decision does not fall within the class of deci-
sions similar to those defined in subsections (a)(2)(A) and (B) of the
present FOIA, there is little public interest in disclosure. If the decision
is one the agency need not publicly disclose, there is no reason to dis-
close the underlying documents. Certainly, if the private documents
are merely a part of the agency's files, the public has no interest in their
disclosure. The invasion of privacy which might result from such dis-
closure, even though very slight, cannot be justified.
Furthermore, not all documents submitted to an agency in the
course of a subsection (a)(2)(A) or (B) type decision should be subject
to disclosure. The public's interest is in knowing the basis for the deci-
sionmaker's determination in a particular case. There is only a margi-
nal interest. in acquiring access to ,the ..complete file. compiled :by the
198. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (National Parks I), opinion after remandsub nom., National
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (National Parks II).
199. See note 175 supra.
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agency in the course of its investigation. This interest is greatly out-
weighed by the burden imposed on the government by broad access.
Thus, only those documents actually reviewed by an agency for pur-
poses of a subsection (a)(2)(A) or (B) type decision should be subject to
disclosure. By so limiting the class of documents subject to disclosure,
the exemption concept may be completely eliminated. Rather than re-
quiring interested persons to request access to such documents, agen-
cies should be required to make them routinely available at the time
the decision is made.
The thrust of this proposal is to compel the government to release
the information necessary to citizen evaluation of agency performance.
Private information that finds its way into government files-whether
through actual compulsion, the submitter's self-interest or voluntary
submission-does not serve this purpose and need not be released.
This approach eliminates disclosure of private information in cases
where there is no legitimate public interest. All other private informa-
tion would be subject to automatic disclosure.
The only situations in which private information relating to im-
portant agency decisions should be protected are those involving a
grant of assurance of confidential treatment. Such grants must be care-
fully limited and monitored. Thus, they should only be permitted
where the agency has established, by rule, a carefully confined system.
Both the rule and the agency's implementation of the rule should be
subject to judicial and legislative review.
VI. TOWARDS A SOLUTION
In the Appendix, new draft legislation is set forth that would im-
prove disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. This proposal
imposes an affirmative duty on the government to disclose information
directly related to government decisionmaking. This approach would
require legislation identifying those documents necessary for citizen
evaluation of governmental performance and compelling disclosure of
such documents. Federal Register publication under subsection (a)(1)
already takes this kind of an affirmative duty approach. Several speci-
fied groups of documents must be published. The primary weakness of
the Federal Register provision is the fact that it requires too much, not
too little, publication.2°° An amendment to subsection (D) of the list is
suggested because the need for change here is so great. The amend-
ment would make it clear that only legislative rules must be published
200. Although improvement in this list is no doubt possible, recommendations for such im-
provement are beyond the scope of this Article.
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in the Federal Register.2"' Publication would be required for purposes
of identifying and announcing the availability of nonlegislative rules
and final opinions in formal adjudications. In addition, there should
be an amendment to section 557 providing that copies of final opinions
in formal adjudications be made available, and to section 553 requiring
publication of statements of the basis and purpose for legislative rules.
The goal is to insure government disclosure of important informa-
tion without the need for affirmative action by the public. Therefore,
the legislative proposal incorporates the categories of subsections
(a)(2)(A) and (B) and expands these categories to require disclosure of
related background information. 02 Agencies would be compelled to
make such information automatically available for public inspection
and copying. Documents related to these categories of agency action
contain most of the important information necessary for evaluation of
an agency's performance. Under current interpretations, these two cat-
egories would include any action affecting the public and not relating
solely to internal management. Since this provision discloses back-
ground information as well as the decision itself, disclosure under sub-
section (B) would include the "record" for all rulemaking. 0 3 The
provision compels the agency to make public, with or without request,
all information in its files relating to significant agency action.
The public interest in the release of private information, including
information relating to important government decisions, may not al-
ways outweigh the potential harm to privacy or to business interests.
Therefore, Congress may wish to retain some protection for private in-
formation contained in agency files. The best approach to this problem
would involve the use of individualized systems, developed by the
agencies themselves, for granting assurances of confidential treatment.
Circumstances under which assurances could be granted must be care-
fully limited; blanket grants or automatic form grants should not be
201. K. DAVIS, SEVENTIES 72-73.
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976) requires the agency to make available, even without a request:
(A) final opinions. . . made in the adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the
agenc and are not published in the Federal Register, and(C) adm iistrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the
public.
There is less need for the documents relating to subsection (a)(2)(C) decisions. In contrast to
subsections (a)(2)(A) and (B), which are intended to inform the public as to the substantive law of
the agency, including so-called "secret law," the purpose of subsection (a)(2)(C) is to inform af-
fected citizens of the administrative or procedural decisions of the agency. It is most important to
disclose the existence of procedural rules; it is much less important to determine the alternatives
explored and the reasons for their rejection. Therefore, publication of background information
related to subsection (a)(2)(C) decisions does not appear to be necessary in this disclosure scheme.
203. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973).
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established. The allegations of harm should be weighed in individual
cases and confidentiality should be assured only after individual deter-
minations. Even then, grants of confidentiality should be limited in
duration. Business information, in particular, loses its importance
quickly and should only be protected for a brief period of time.
Congress may also wish to provide special treatment for internal
memoranda. In any event, agencies should be required to make all
information previously withheld, including internal documents, avail-
able no later than one year after the final decision. Such an approach
would balance the traditional need for free and frank discussion within
the agency against the public right to access to agency records relating
to important decisions. Agencies would be free to waive this exception
and promptly disclose all memoranda in their possession. Automatic
release of all information related to significant governmental decisions
should adequately provide for public evaluation of governmental per-
formance at a substantial savings to the public treasury. Nevertheless,
it is recommended that some back-up release be provided by two provi-
sions: periodic release of all internal memoranda and a mandate to
establish individualized public information access programs.
Disclosure of only those documents related to significant agency
decisions will adequately serve to inform the general public. However,
if the validity of this conclusion is doubted, Congress may adopt the
proposed provision making all internal memoranda available for pub-
lic inspection and copying after the expiration of a five year period.
It is strongly recommended that Congress authorize and encourage
agencies to develop their own access systems. The budgetary process
provides the most effective means of assuring the effectiveness of these
individual programs. The agencies themselves could establish pro-
grams for informing the public about their operations and decisions.
Funding for these access programs would be available only if the
agency established a viable system for conveying information. Periodic
review by Congress and the Office of Management and Budget would
prevent degeneration of the programs into mere public relation
schemes.
Special access to governmental information should be granted to
certain groups. It seems clear that programs allowing special access to
scholars should be implemented. Consideration should also be given to
providing special access to the media.
A brief provision for informal discovery, or access to participants,
is included in this proposal. However, the problem is exceedingly com-
plicated and a major, separate effort should be made in this direction.
This effort might begin with a study by the Administrative Conference
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of the United States. While the informal discovery problem should be
treated separately from the citizen education problem, this proposal
might serve as a temporary solution until Congress can produce a com-
prehensive and permanent legislative solution.
Enforcement of the proposed legislation requires careful analysis.
Special provision for judicial review should eliminate any problem of
standing, exhaustion or reviewability. The de novo standard of judicial
review should be abandoned and agency action should be examined
only for arbitrary or capricious behavior or abuse of discretion.2 4 The
right of the general public under this proposal would be limited to in-
suring that the agency carries out the required access functions. Any
person would be authorized to seek an injunction in federal district
court to prevent noncompliance by an agency. Review of agency ac-
tion would be available in the courts of appeal under sections 701-706
of the APA. Agencies would be required to promulgate rules designat-
ing which decisions are to be subject to automatic disclosure and to
disclose the identity of any entities other than the agency that are re-
sponsible for decisions. Review of these rules, and all other imple-
menting rules, would be available under a similar mechanism.
Administrative enforcement should be preferred over judicial en-
forcement. Perhaps an administrative agency should be established to
assume responsibility for the public information system. At least two
commentators have constructed a comprehensive proposal,205 and it
should be weighed carefully in any restructuring of the public informa-
tion system. This Article is not an attempt to improve on that scheme,
but merely suggests temporary administrative audit and enforcement
through the General Accounting Office.
The present subsections (c) and (e) have been retained. Because
the proposal would omit the exemptions, the problem of congressional
access should not arise. However, the retention of subsection (c) will
effectively prevent such a problem. Subsection (e) is arguably more
inclusive than the definition of "agency" in section 551 and hence
should be retained. Disclosure requirements should have as broad a
coverage as possible.
Subsection (d) would be repealed. Annual report provisions are
very much in vogue but experience shows that annual reports to Con-
gress are generally a waste of public funds. The budget request over-
sights are much more effective and should be relied on for effective
congressional audit.
204. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
205. Miller & Cox, supra note 46.
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This proposal relies on the bureaucracy to perform functions that
many have seen to be against their interest. However, the notion that
the bureaucracy will "stonewall" any disclosure provisions is inaccu-
rate; provisions for routine disclosure of discrete classes of information
will encourage agencies to comply with a reasonable statute designed to
accommodate the interests of government, persons dealing with the
government and the public at large. Indeed, the proposal can be seen
as a logical extension of the Sunshine Act.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress has constructed a public information system by enacting
the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act and the Sunshine Act,
and through House and Senate Rules and disclosure legislation refer-
ring to specific agencies such as the IRS. This piecemeal legislation has
failed to create a unified system. A major congressional effort should
be made to develop a comprehensive public information system. This
will require a new approach to the disclosure problem. The authors
have seen the problem from the perspective of those who attempt to
release information under the Act. The present system fails, not only
with regard to adequate dissemination of information about govern-
ment, but also in terms of the overall public interest. It has not im-
proved the quality of government or the ability of the government to
operate in the public interest, and it cannot do so without dispropor-
tionate cost to those same values.
An amended version of the present Freedom of Information Act
follows. These amendments attempt to cure only a few of the problems
of the present public information system. The adoption of these pro-
posals would be only a beginning. The entire public information sys-
tem must be subjected to careful scrutiny and substantial reform. The
operations of the government have changed dramatically since the last
comprehensive review of the public information delivery system in
1946. This Article proposes that Congress step back and determine the
goals of the system and design a comprehensive scheme to provide the
maximum public information with the minimum disruption of govern-
ment.
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APPENDIX
To Amend the Public Information Section of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled.
Sec. 1. Short Title. This Act may be cited as the "Public Information Act of
19-."
Sec. 2. Purpose. Congress intends to improve the efficacy and efficiency of
the mechanism for making information about the performance of government
available to citizens and the mechanism for providing access to information
necessary to participation in administrative proceedings.
Part I
Sec. 3. Federal Register. Subsection (a)(1)(D) of Section 552 of Title 5 of
the United States Code is repealed and in its place:
"(D) rules which the agency states will have the force of law when
such rules are authorized by statute; and the means by which
a person may obtain interpretative rules and general state-
ments of policy, and obtain final opinions in adjudication
conducted pursuant to 554. ,206
Repeal of the Public Access Provision
Sec. 4. Subsections (a)(2) and (3) and Subsection (b) of Section 552 of Title 5
of the United States Code are repealed.
Sec. 5. Section 552 of Title 5 of the United States Code is amended to read as
follows:
After Subsection (a) add:
"(b)(1) Each agency, in accordance with published rules made pursuant
to Subsection (f), shall make available for public inspection and copying:
(A) All final orders and opinions resulting from an adjudicative
process, either formal or informal, and all records relating to such final orders
or opinions;
(B) All rules or statements of policy, either general or specific, which
are not published in the Federal Register and all records relating to such rules
or statements of policy;
(C) All records relating to agency action which are published in the
Federal Register;
(D) Administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect
the public;
(E) An index of final orders resulting from any adjudication, rules,
statements of policy, all matters which must be published in the Federal Reg-
ister, and administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect the
public. The index shall list these actions and decisions by relevant statutory
provisions, if any, and by subject matter. The index shall give the specific
location of records made available by this Subsection.
206. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1976) are amended in Part II infra.
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(2) This provision may be enforced in any way provided by law. In
addition, a final order, opinion, rule, statement of policy, or staff manual or
instruction that affects the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent
by an agency against a party other than an agency only if it is indexed and
made available for public inspection and copying pursuant to (b)(1), even if
'the affected person has actual notice.
(3) Each agency shall promulgate regulations, in accordance with
published rules made pursuant to Subsection (f), identifying types of agency
actions subject to this Subsection.
[Optional:
(4) Each agency may provide, in accordance with published rules
made pursuant to Subsection (f), for the protection, not in excess of one year,
of inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters, which would not be
available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.
(5)(i) To the extent required to prevent an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, an agency may delete identifying details in any material
made available under this Subsection;
(ii) An agency, in accordance with published rules made pursuant
to Subsection (f), may provide for assurances of confidentiality for personal
information, the release of which would constitute an invasion of personal
privacy, and for information, the value of which would be substantially less-
ened by release to the public.]
(c) Each agency, in accordance with published rules made pursuant to
Subsection (f), shall make available for public inspection and copying inter-
agency or intra-agency memoranda and letters five years after their comple-
tion. To the extent required to-prevent an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy, an agency may delete identifying detail.
(d) Each agency may provide by rule, made pursuant to Subsection (f),
for special access to information for scholarly research by bona fide scholars or
for other uses by those who will assist in informing the public. The regulations
will prescribe criteria defining scholars and other categories of persons who
will be given special access. Bona fide scholars may, in accordance with rules
assuring confidentiality, be given total access to agency files if the public inter-
est is served by their access. All other persons granted special access should
not have access to information, the value of which would be substantially less-
ened by release to the public; private information which would be privileged
in federal court, or information which would constitute an invasion of per-
sonal privacy, including that information protected by Section 552a.
(e) Each agency shall, by rule made pursuant to Subsection (f), provide
for the availability of information to those directly affected by an agency ac-
tion upon a showing of need for information relevant to use in the specific
proceeding. The rules may not deny access to relevant factual material but
may consider appropriate protections to preserve the confidentiality of infor-
mation obtained from a person and possible interference with the law enforce-
ment functions of the agency. Denial of relevant information to one directly
affected must be accompanied by reasons.2"7
207. The discovery problem should be solved in an entirely separate legislative undertaking.
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(f) Rules required by this Section and amendments to such rules may
be made only after a proposed rule or amendment is published for public com-
ment, and must be promulgated promptly upon receipt and consideration of
the comments. Initial proposed rules shall be prepared by each agency and
published for comment within ninety days of the effective date of this Act.
(g) Each agency shall include in its annual budget, programs aimed at
providing information to the public and a full discussion and evaluation of
these programs and past programs. These programs shall be designed to as-
sure that the public has access to as much information as feasible about the
agency including its internal operations and decisionmaking processes.
(h) An agency shall not release information specifically authorized
under criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the inter-
est of national defense or foreign policy.
Sec. 6. (a) Subsection 552(c) of Title 5 of the United States Code is
redesignated Subsection (i).
(b) Subsection 552(d) of Title 5 of the United States Code is repealed.
(c) Subsection 552(e) of Title 5 of the United States Code is
redesignated Subsection (j).
Sec. 7. Section 552 of Title 5 of the United States Code is amended by ad-
ding:
"(k) Judicial Review.
(1) Any agency action, taken pursuant to this Section, may be
reviewed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976) on petition of any person to
any United States Court of Appeals.
(2) Any person may file for injunctive relief/declaratory judg-
ment in any United States District Court against an agency for failure to com-
ply with a requirement of this Section. The complaint must demonstrate that
the failure was brought to the attention of the agency and the agency failed or
refused to act.
(1) Administrative Enforcement.
The General Accounting Office shall audit agency compliance and re-
port recalcitrant agencies to Congress.
208
Part II
Sec. 8. Publication of Legislative Rule. Section 553(c) of Title 5 of the
United States Code is amended to add after the third sentence: "The rule and
statement of basis and purpose shall be published in the Federal Register."
Sec. 9. Availability of Final Orders and Opinions. Section 557(c) of Title 5 of
the United States Code is amended to add after the last sentence: 'The final
order, decision, and opinion shall be made available for public. inspection and
copy pursuant to Section 552 of this title."
208. This provision will serve until establishment of a National Commission on Document
Access. See Miller & Cox, On a Need For a National Commission on Documentary Access, 44
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 213 (1976).
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